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A  P O S T C O L O N I A L  T H E O R Y  O F  S P O U S A L  R A P E :
T H E  C A R I B B E A N  A N D  B E Y O N D
tacy-nn  lvy*
Many postcolonial states in the Caribbean continue to struggle
to comply with their international treaty obligations to protect
women from sexual violence. Reports from various United Nations
programs, including UNICEF, and the annual U.S. State Depart-
ment Country Reports on Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Bar-
bados, Dominica, Jamaica, and Saint Lucia (“Commonwealth
Countries”), indicate that sexual violence against women, including
spousal abuse, is a significant problem in the Caribbean. Despite
ratification of various international instruments intended to elimi-
nate sexual violence against women, such as the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Com-
monwealth Countries have retained the common law spousal rape
exemption. While much has been written on the topic of spousal rape
in common law jurisdictions, this Article is unique in at least three
respects. First, this Article is part of a larger project that seeks to trace
the connections between colonial history and contemporary law in
postcolonial states with the aim of developing a typology of the en-
during effects of colonial laws and norms. Second, this Article uses
postcolonial theory to provide a theoretical framework for critiquing
the colonial roots of the modern-day spousal rape exemption in Com-
monwealth Countries. Third, this Article posits that postcolonial
theory offers many insights regarding the history of colonialism and
modern-day power dynamics and identities in Commonwealth
Countries. The Article uses postcolonial theory to advocate for a
norms-based approach to changing the structures that perpetuate in-
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equality, and goes on to suggest the need for changes to negative
norms regarding the role of women in marriage, with the aim of
creating national and individual identities that value compliance
with modern human rights norms. The Article recommends legal,
social, legislative, and judicial internalization of human rights
norms. While these solutions are not new, the Article uses
postcolonial theory to assess which solution may be more viable, as
well as to determine the best way to implement internalization of
human rights norms given the colonial heritage and politics of
postcolonial Commonwealth Countries.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The abuse climaxed on a Friday night in February 2008.
Minus the details that, to this day, make me uncomfortable
[. . .], he returned to the home, intoxicated [and] physically as-
saulted me over a period of seven hours and finally raped me. I
called the police. As I recounted the events of the night, what I
recall most of this dialogue, was that it seemed very important to
the police that I understand that I was not ‘raped’. Rape, two
officers made clear for me that morning, could not take place
between a man and a wife, and unless they were separated for a
period of one year (it was seven months) and therefore legally
separated, rape did not exist. As it were, we were still man and
wife. Admittedly, while it was as hard for me to be subjective
that morning, as it is still now – the police were not offended by
this cruel and violent act, rather they spent their efforts that
morning. . . humiliating me – in diminishing the occurrences of
that night to something insignificant and of little consequence,
while to me, the events of that night had possibly more reverber-
ations onto my life than any other event of my thirty-three years.
It was also the first time I had ever felt ashamed to be a woman.
[. . . ] While the police officers seemed not to take my abuse
seriously, neither did the judge – and while it was offensive and
humiliating when the police officers did so it was absolutely dev-
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astating when the judge made light of my situation and did not
offer me the protection I had literally begged for.1
The preceding quote is one victim’s alleged account of her attempt to
obtain legal relief in Barbados after her husband raped her, and it exempli-
fies the pervasive problem of spousal rape in the Caribbean.
Historically, rape within the context of marriage has not been viewed
as “legitimate rape.”2 Current discussions on the topic of “legitimate rape”
also continue to occur in countries outside of the Caribbean. When describ-
ing the effects of rape on the female body, former United States congress-
man Todd Akin stated, “it seems to be, first of all, from what I understand
from doctors, [pregnancy from rape is] really rare. If it’s a legitimate rape,
the female body has ways to try to shut the whole thing down.”3 When
addressing the issue of spousal rape, Akin argued that laws criminalizing
spousal rape may be used by women ‘‘in a real messy divorce as a tool and a
legal weapon to beat up on the husband.”4 In July 2014, Akin attempted to
justify his previous statements by arguing that law enforcement officials fre-
quently use the term “legitimate rape.”5 Recently, U.S. congressional candi-
date Dick Black has been criticized for contending that spousal rape does
not inflict injury on women.6 Similarly, in defending accused rapist Julian
Assange, George Galloway, a prominent British politician, stated that hav-
ing sex with a sleeping woman was not rape and that “not everybody needs
to be asked prior to each insertion.”7
1. Juliette Maughan, Domestic Violence in Barbados: Who Will Protect the Victim,
WORLD PULSE (May 4, 2012), http://worldpulse.com/node/52523.
2. SUSAN CARINGELLA, ADDRESSING RAPE REFORM IN LAW AND PRACTICE 20 (2009).
3. Lori Moore, Rep. Todd Akin: The Statement and the Reaction, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/21/us/politics/rep-todd-akin-legitimate-
rape-statement-and-reaction.html.
4. William Saletan, The Rape Skeptic, SLATE (Aug. 22, 2012, 9:36 AM), http://www
.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/frame_game/2012/08/todd_akin_s_apology_
his_comments_on_spousal_rape_and_forcible_rape_show_mistrust_of_women_
.html.
5. Charlotte Alter, Todd Akin Still Doesn’t Get What’s Wrong With Saying ‘Legitimate
Rape’, TIME (July 17, 2014), http://time.com/3001785/todd-akin-legitimate-rape-
msnbc-child-of-rape/.
6. Samantha Lachman, GOP Congressional Candidate Dick Black Doesn’t Have a Prob-
lem with Spousal Rape, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 15, 2014, 1:22 PM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/15/dick-black-rape_n_4602683.html.
7. Fiona Lloyd-Davies, Why Have Men Lost Touch with Reality over Rape?, CNN (Aug.
23, 2012, 11:05 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/23/opinion/akin-galloway-
opinion/index.html; see also Severin Carrell, George Galloway Sacked as Political Col-
umnist for Rape Remarks, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2012, 11:16 AM), http://www
.guardian.co.uk/politics/2012/aug/22/george-galloway-sacked-holyrood-
rape?newsfeed=true.
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While much has been written on the topic of spousal rape in common
law jurisdictions, this Article is unique in at least three respects.8 First, this
Article is part of a larger project that seeks to trace the connections between
colonial history and contemporary law in postcolonial states,9 with the aim
of developing a typology of the enduring effects of colonial laws and norms.
The impact of colonial history may be distinct in certain places and cultural
contexts. For instance, colonial laws and history may have long-lasting ef-
fects over time in one context, while local cultural issues that emerge post-
independence may take precedence over colonial history in another context.
Second, although there may be various reasons for the retention of the
spousal rape exemption,10 this Article uses postcolonial theory to provide a
8. See, e.g., DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE (1990) (describing spousal rape
laws in the United States); Emily J. Stack, Is Domestic Violence a Crime?: Intimate
Partner Rape as Allegory, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 535 (2010) (discussing
spousal rape and domestic violence); Morgan Lee Woolley, Marital Rape: A Unique
Blend of Domestic Violence and Non-Marital Rape Issues, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J.
269 (2007 (discussing domestic and international treatment of marital rape and the
inadequacies of responding to marital rape solely within the rubric of domestic vio-
lence or non-marital rape); Sonya A. Adamo, Note, The Injustice of the Marital Rape
Exemption: A Survey of Common Law Countries, 4 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 555
(1989) (discussing spousal rape laws in England, Scotland, New Zealand, South Af-
rica, Australia, and Canada); Wendy Larcombe & Mary Heath, Developing the Com-
mon Law and Rewriting the History of Rape in Marriage in Australia: PGA v. The
Queen, 34 SYDNEY L. REV. 785 (2012) (describing spousal rape case law in Austra-
lia); Jennifer Koshan, The Legal Treatment of Marital Rape and Women’s Equality: An
Analysis of the Canadian Experience, THE EQUALITY EFFECT (2010), http://theequali-
tyeffect.org/pdfs/maritalrapecanadexperience.pdf (describing spousal rape in
Canada).
9. The term ‘postcolonial states’ refers to states that are former colonies of European
powers.
10. One potential explanation for the retention of the spousal rape exemption and sexual
violence against women is the lack of sustained economic development in Common-
wealth Countries, which has implications for women’s roles in society. In addition to
having a large or majority Afro-Caribbean population, some Caribbean countries,
such as Trinidad & Tobago, are comprised of diverse groups from India, many of
whom came to Trinidad as indentured servants or contract laborers during the colo-
nial period. See Lomarsh Roopnarine, Indian Migration During Indentured Servitude
in British Guiana and Trinidad, 1850–1920, 52 LABOR HISTORY 173 (2011). Indo-
Muslim and Indo-Hindu cultural values regarding the role of women in society may
also have contributed to the retention of the spousal rape exemption in Common-
wealth Countries; however, Trinidad has a much larger Indian population when
compared to other Commonwealth Countries and Trinidad eliminated the spousal
rape exemption in 2000. Kusha R. Haraksingh, Structure, Process and Indian Culture
in Trinidad, in AFTER THE CROSSING: IMMIGRANTS AND MINORITIES IN CARIB-
BEAN CREOLE SOCIETY 113, 113–14 (Howard Johnson ed., 1990). Additionally,
Spanish colonial rule, which preceded British colonial rule in the Caribbean, may
have imparted long lasting identities and norms on Commonwealth Countries.
DENNIS M. P. MCCARTHY, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ORGANIZED CRIME: A
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theoretical framework for critiquing the colonial roots of the modern-day
spousal rape exemption in Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados,
Dominica, Jamaica, and Saint Lucia (“Commonwealth Countries”). This
has important implications not only for scholars, policy makers, and civil
society groups in this area but also for norm construction.
Third, this Article posits that postcolonial theory offers many insights
regarding the history of colonialism and modern-day power dynamics and
identities in Commonwealth Countries. The Article acknowledges
postcolonial agency while simultaneously using postcolonial theory to evalu-
ate the ways in which colonialism continues to percolate through the politi-
cal, legal, and social structures of postcolonial Commonwealth Countries.
For instance, despite the current international debate regarding what consti-
tutes ‘legitimate rape’ under domestic law, the Inter-American Convention
on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against
Women (“IAS Convention”) and the Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”) recognize the right
of women to be free from all forms of violence, including spousal rape.11
The laws of Commonwealth Countries generally criminalize spousal rape
only where a decree nisi of divorce, a separation order, a formal separation
agreement, or a protective order is in place at the time of the rape.12 A
husband may escape prosecution for raping his wife if none of these condi-
tions is satisfied. By codifying the common law spousal rape exemption,
Commonwealth Countries have placed their domestic laws at odds with
their obligation to protect women from sexual violence and discrimination
under CEDAW and the IAS Convention. Thus, there is a distinct gap be-
tween treaty ratification and treaty compliance. These countries have also
unwittingly created tensions between statutory law and human rights guar-
anteed by their constitutions, such as the right to equal protection. Through
the use of postcolonial theory, this Article contends that by codifying the
spousal rape exemption, Commonwealth Countries continue to perpetuate
the misogynistic rationales used during the colonial period to justify the
common law spousal rape exemption. Under the common law implied con-
sent theory, a woman was deemed to have consented to sexual intercourse
with her husband upon marriage, and such consent was irrevocable. The
NATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL APPROACH 170 (2011) (describing Spanish colo-
nial rule in Jamaica from 1494–1655).
11. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women art.
2, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 20378 [hereinafter CEDAW]; Inter-American
Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against
Women art. 6, June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1534 [hereinafter Convention of Belém do
Pará].
12. See infra Part III.B.
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spousal rape statutes of Commonwealth Countries criminalize spousal rape
only when steps have been taken to revoke a woman’s implied consent, such
as when a separation order has been issued prior to, and is still in place at
the time of, the rape.
This Article is an incomplete exploration of rape law in Common-
wealth Countries, as it does not address the numerous evidentiary and crim-
inal procedure issues related to rape prosecution. However, the goal of this
Article is to begin to understand the extent to which the history of colonial-
ism influences not only existing structures of law, power dynamics, and
identities in postcolonial states, but also the readiness of postcolonial states
to comply with emerging human rights norms by using the spousal rape
statutes of Commonwealth Countries and Trinidad and Tobago as a case
study. This may help to identify strategies for promoting postcolonial state
compliance with international law, thereby facilitating the protection of
human rights recognized by international instruments and guaranteed by
postcolonial state constitutions.
A postcolonial reading of the spousal rape statutes of Commonwealth
Countries suggests that these laws should be revised to fully criminalize
spousal rape, not only to comply with constitutional principles and interna-
tional law, but also to deconstruct the colonial foundations of Caribbean
law that continue to foster a cultural identity that views women as “other.”
One of the insights that postcolonial theory has in common with a norms-
based approach to human rights enforcement is the focus on the creation of
new identities. Norms based scholars contend that human rights will be
more effectively protected in countries where human rights norms are firmly
lodged within domestic systems.13 Embedding such norms within domestic
systems may facilitate the creation of national and individual identities that
value state compliance with human rights law. This Article uses postcolonial
theory to advocate for a norms-based approach to changing the structures
13. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599 (1997) (defining social, political, legal, legislative, and judicial internalization
of international norms and discussing the importance of such domestic internaliza-
tion to the transnational legal process). According to Koh, social internalization oc-
curs when a norm acquires widespread domestic legitimacy, legislative internalization
occurs when legislation is changed to reflect human rights norms because of domes-
tic lobbying efforts, and judicial internalization occurs where domestic litigation
leads to the incorporation of international human rights norms by the judiciary. Id.
at 2656–57. Political internalization occurs when political elites accept an interna-
tional norm and adopt it as a matter of government policy. Id. at 2657. References to
legal internalization in this Article refer to the incorporation of human rights norms
through legislative and executive action only. In contrast, Koh uses the term legal
internalization to refer to domestic incorporation via the actions of the executive,
judiciary, or legislative branch. Id.
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that perpetuate inequality, and goes on to suggest the need for changes to
negative norms regarding the role of women in marriage, with the aim of
creating national and individual identities that are more willing to accept
modern human rights norms. In that regard, the Article recommends legal,
social, legislative, and judicial internalization of human rights norms in a
manner that considers the colonial heritage of Commonwealth Countries.
Although none of the norms-based solutions proposed in this Article
are new, postcolonial theory can also be used to suggest which solution may
be most effective, as well as to assess how to implement such a solution in a
particular context. This Article posits that a judicial decision rendered by
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (“British Privy Council”), the
final court of appeals of most Commonwealth Countries,14 invalidating
these statutes would be unlikely to provide a viable solution. Common-
wealth Countries have historically opposed judicial internalization of inter-
national human rights norms by the British Privy Council. In the 1990s,
Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica denounced a number of human rights
treaties, including treaties granting jurisdiction to international human
rights tribunals.15 This opposition occurred as a result of a British Privy
Council decision, discussed in Part IV below, based on constitutional and
human rights grounds that seriously hindered the ability of Commonwealth
Countries to impose the death penalty.16 In contrast, similar decisions by
the Caribbean Court of Justice, a regional court of final appeals established
by Caribbean countries, internalizing human rights norms have been better
received by Caribbean countries. Successful internalization of human rights
norms is more likely to occur where such internalization is fostered locally,
such as by local regional courts and Caribbean judges, rather than by the
British Privy Council, a relic of colonial rule. Further, Trinidad and To-
bago’s successful efforts to reform its laws to eliminate the spousal rape
exemption also highlight that Commonwealth Countries may be more will-
ing to internalize human rights norms via statutory reform when such
norms are generated from the bottom up via the actions of local interest
groups, such as a women’s rights movement, rather than imposed solely
from the top down.
14. The Privy Council is the British court that provides final appellate review of the
judicial decisions of Caribbean countries that have not yet acceded to the jurisdiction
of the Caribbean Court of Justice (“CCJ”). See David Simmons, The Caribbean
Court of Justice: A Unique Institution of Caribbean Creativity, 29 NOVA L. REV. 169,
170 (2005).
15. See Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory
and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash against Human Rights Regimes, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1881 (2002).
16. Id. at 1834.
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Despite the elimination of the spousal rape exemption in Trinidad in
2000, Trinidadian women continue to suffer from a culture of sexual vio-
lence, which may be due in part to the failure to effectively change power
dynamics and negative identities. Trinidad and Tobago, like many other
Commonwealth Countries, has failed to incorporate CEDAW and the IAS
Convention on the domestic plane.17 The failure to incorporate such trea-
ties signals an incomplete internalization of the human rights norms con-
tained in these treaties, as well as a lack of commitment to protecting the
human rights of women, particularly when a country has chosen to incor-
porate treaties intended to protect the interests of other vulnerable members
of society. Additionally, Trinidad and Tobago has neglected to ratify the
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW Optional Protocol”), which au-
thorizes the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimina-
tion Against Women (“CEDAW Committee”) to receive and consider
complaints from individuals and groups for violation of rights under
CEDAW.18
As used in this Article, the term “stranger rape” refers to rape commit-
ted by a perpetrator who is not married to the victim, while “spousal rape”
refers to rape committed by a perpetrator who is legally married to the
17. Some countries have incorporated CEDAW in the domestic plane. CEDAW in the
United States: Why a Treaty for the Rights of Women, Women’s Env’t & Dev. Org.,
http://.wedo.org///.pdf. Columbia incorporated CEDAW into domestic legislation
in 1981 and Columbian women have successfully used CEDAW to lobby for domes-
tic violence legislation. Id.; see also, Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination Against Women, 6th Sess., ¶ 464, U.N. Doc. A//; GAOR, 42d Sess.,
Supp. No. 38 (May 15, 1987); Beijing Betrayed: Women Worldwide Report that Gov-
ernments Have Failed to Turn the Platform into Action, Women’s Env’t & Dev. Org.
(Mar. 2005), http://.wedo.org///.pdf. In Rwanda, women have used CEDAW to
reserve 30% of seats in parliament for women. Id. Some cities in the United States,
such as San Francisco, have also incorporated CEDAW via legislation. Dept. on the
Status of Women, City and County of San Francisco, CEDAW in Action: Local Im-
plementation in the City and County of San Francisco (2010), http://. sfgov3.org/////
___.pdf.
18. In addition to complaints from individuals and groups, the Optional Protocol to
CEDAW also allows the CEDAW Committee to initiate inquiries into situations of
grave or systematic violations of women’s rights. Optional Protocol to the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Oct. 6,
1999, 2131 U.N.T.S. 83 [hereinafter CEDAW Optional Protocol]. Today, of the
105 countries that have ratified the CEDAW Optional Protocol, the twin-island
nation of Antigua and Barbuda is the only Commonwealth country that has ratified
this protocol. See Ratification Status: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, U.N. TREATY COLLEC-
TION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
8-b&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Sept. 17, 2014).
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victim. Part II of this Article introduces postcolonial theory and provides a
history of the common law justifications for the spousal rape exemption.
This section contends that during the colonial period, the doctrine of recep-
tion was used to impose on Commonwealth Countries British rules and
norms regarding the role of women. Part III of this Article conducts a
postcolonial reading of the spousal rape statutes of Commonwealth Coun-
tries and the CARICOM model rape statute. This section posits that these
statutes fail to adequately protect women who experience sexual violence at
the hands of their husbands and continue to perpetuate the common law
justifications for the spousal rape exemption. Part IV of this Article argues
that given the Commonwealth Caribbean resistance to a top-down imposi-
tion of modern-day human rights norms in the 1990s, it is unlikely that a
British Privy Council decision that invalidates the sexual offence laws of
Commonwealth Countries will provide a suitable solution. Part V contends
that Trinidad and Tobago’s legal reform efforts can provide useful lessons
for other postcolonial countries, including the need for cultural change de-
spite legal reform and the need for domestic incorporation of international
treaties. Finally, Part VI proposes solutions in light of Trinidad and To-
bago’s experience, as well as the Caribbean opposition to human rights
norms, such as legislative, social, and judicial internalization of the human
rights norms set forth in the IAS Convention and CEDAW.
II. POSTCOLONIAL THEORY AND THE COMMON LAW
A. Postcolonial Theory
To the extent that the law produces identities, vestiges of colonial laws
perpetuate the existence of colonial identities in postcolonial countries.
Postcolonial scholars posit that “colonialism does not really end, except in a
legal sense, as the effects of colonialism are enduring for both the colonizers
and the colonized.”19 Postcolonial scholars, such as Leela Gandhi and Gaya-
tri Spivak, posit that postcolonial theory is particularly concerned with
identifying the ways in which current orderings in postcolonial countries
continue to reflect their colonial origins.20 Postcolonial theory does not con-
tend that all ills currently faced by postcolonial countries can be laid at the
feet of the colonizer; rather, it recognizes postcolonial agency while contem-
poraneously seeking to expose the ongoing role played by colonialism in
postcolonial political, legal, and cultural structures. Postcolonial theory rep-
resents an interdisciplinary approach to law and presents new ways of con-
19. Alpana Roy, Postcolonial Theory and Law: A Critical Introduction, 29 ADEL. L. REV.
315, 318 (2008).
20. LEELA GANDHI, POSTCOLONIAL THEORY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 7–8 (1998).
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ceptualizing legal structures.21 It is also concerned with critiquing the
“assumptions and representations on which colonialism is based.”22
Postcolonial theory can be used, and is now being more frequently
used, by legal scholars to critique legal discourse.23 Postcolonial theory ac-
knowledges that independence “does not result in a return to a pre-colonial
state, but rather movement into a ‘postcolonial’ state, where the effects of
colonialism have become an inextricable part of the culture and of its legal,
educational, and political institutions, and where the colonial state still
serves as a reference point in local discourse.”24 Other postcolonial theorists
posit that postcolonialism is now the central vehicle through which the
West relates to its “other” and that the “law has been . . . [in] the forefront
of that very relation.”25 Legal scholars have used postcolonial theory to as-
sess the role of law during the colonial period, to illustrate the ongoing
impacts of colonialism, “to identify new forms of harm and domination,
and [to] trace the contemporary condition of subjugation of the historically
Othered.”26 Postcolonial theory has been used to address current issues such
as identity, globalization, racism, and reterritorialization of the non-Western
world.27
Much of postcolonial theory focuses on the rethinking of power dy-
namics and the creation of identities. Power is viewed as central not only to
oppression, but also to the production of identities and subjects.28 Modern
postcolonial theorists have focused on the connections between economic,
social, and political structures and practices, in addition to the ways in
which power and such practices shape identities in postcolonial countries.29
For instance, in her work on colonialism in Kenya, Roxanne Lynn Doty
contends that colonial practices that were designed to “get the natives to
work” “constructed particular kinds of identities for the colonial popula-
tion.”30 Similarly, western constructions of democracy, good governance,
and development have created new identities and new subjectivities as illus-
21. Roy, supra note 19, at 316.
22. JENNI RAMONE, POSTCOLONIAL THEORIES 1 (2011).
23. Roy, supra note 19, at 315.
24. MARGARET DAVIES, ASKING THE LAW QUESTION: THE DISSOLUTION OF LEGAL
THEORY 278 (2d ed. 2002); see also Roy, supra note 19, at 316.
25. Roy, supra note 19, at 315; see also Peter Fitzpatrick & Eve Darian-Smith, Introduc-
tion to LAWS OF THE POSTCOLONIAL 1, 1–15 (Fitzpatrick & Darian-Smith eds.,
1999).
26. Roy, supra note 19, at 319, 357.
27. Id. at 357.
28. Rita Abrahamson, African Studies and the Post Colonial Challenge, 102 J. AFR. AFF.
189, 198 (2003).
29. Id. at 200.
30. Id. at 201.
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trated by a study of rural India where “underdevelopment has become a new
form of identity.”31
Postcolonial perspectives, like a norms-based approach to human
rights enforcement, recognize that in order to achieve sustainable changes to
structures of inequality there must be a “parallel change of . . . the epistemo-
logical and psychological underpinnings and effects of such structures [in-
cluding related identities and power dynamics].”32 Thus, postcolonial
theory can provide insights on the varied reasons for the perpetuation of
structures of inequality in postcolonial countries and it can also be used to
propose and identify how best to implement solutions to reform aspects of
postcolonial social, legal, and political structures that facilitate inequality.
For instance, health care scholars have used postcolonial theory to generate
solutions to improve healthcare for pregnant women in groups historically
marginalized by colonialism.33
Some scholars have argued that all-inclusive labels such as colonialism
and postcolonialism fail to consider the sameness that may exist between
colonized countries and countries that do not have a history of colonialism
and, further, that these labels fail to account for differences between colo-
nized nations.34 For instance, pre-colonized cultures and countries that have
not been colonized may have had views similar to those imposed by colonial
powers regarding the role of women within marriage. Critics contend that
in the context of postcolonial theory, countries such as Bangladesh and Aus-
tralia become unified under the umbrella of their European colonial history
despite the fact that these countries have distinct colonial experiences.35
As postcolonial theorist Leela Gandhi notes, while postcolonial theory
recognizes a shared history of colonialism among countries, postcolonial
theory also acknowledges the distinct ways in which colonialism has influ-
enced the history and power structures of individual postcolonial states.36
Gandhi contends that there is “fundamental incommensurability between
the predominately cultural subordination of settler culture in Australia and
the predominately administrative and militarist subordination of colonized
culture in Africa and Asia.”37
31. Id. at 203.
32. Id. at 209.
33. See Annette J. Browne et al., The Relevance of Postcolonial Theoretical Perspectives to
Research in Aboriginal Health, 37 CAN. J. NURSING RES. 16  (2005); see also Dawn A.
Smith et al., ‘Making a Difference’: A New Care Paradigm for Pregnant and Parenting
Aboriginal People, 98 CAN. J. PUB. HEALTH, 321, 321–24 (2007).
34. GANDHI, supra note 20, at 168.
35. Helen Tiffin, Introduction to PAST THE LAST POST: THEORIZING POST-COLONIAL-
ISM AND POST-MODERNISM vii, (Ian Adam & Helen Tiffin eds., 1991).
36. GANDHI, supra note 20, at 170.
37. Id.
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Colonialism continues to have a unique enduring impact on the judi-
cial systems of many Commonwealth Countries. The British Privy Council
originated in 1833 as the highest court of civil and criminal appeal for the
British Empire.38 At one point in history the British Privy Council served as
the final court of appeals for over a quarter of the world.39 However, to date,
in addition to British territories and crown dependencies, only thirteen in-
dependent countries, including Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Ja-
maica, Dominica, St. Lucia, Mauritius, and Trinidad and Tobago, have
retained the British Privy Council as a final court of appeals.40 In contrast,
Nigeria, South Africa, and Ghana, all former British colonies, have estab-
lished their own Supreme Courts after independence.
Spousal rape is a pervasive global problem that is not unique to
postcolonial states, and Commonwealth Countries through their own
agency have elected to codify the common law spousal rape exemption post-
independence. Thus, one may contend that an analysis of spousal rape laws
through a postcolonial lens is unnecessary. However, postcolonial theory
adds significant value to this discourse, as it can suggest insights on the
varied ways in which colonial history impacts modern day legislation and
the retention of identities despite postcolonial agency, while simultaneously
acknowledging the similarities between colonial identities and the tradi-
tional norms and identities of the colonized. For instance, spousal rape re-
mains a significant problem in Nigeria.41 However, direct colonial rule and
38. See The Jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council, http://www.jcpc.uk/docs/jcpc_jurisdiction_map.pdf (last vis-
ited Jul. 23, 2014); see also, e.g., JAM. CONST. pt. 3, § 110 (stating that the constitu-
tion expressly preserved the right to appeals to the Privy Council, generally referred
to as “Her Majesty’s Council.”); compare CCJ Blow: Cabinet Discusses Next Move
Monday, JAMAICA OBSERVER (Feb. 4, 2005), http://web.archive.org/web/20070607
000002/http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/20050203T220000-0500_74
458_OBS_CCJ_BLOW.asp (reporting that in 2005, Jamaica attempted to replace
the British Privy Council with the CCJ but the British Privy Council held that the
process used was unconstitutional), with Dominica Moving to Cut Ties with Privy
Council, JAMAICA OBSERVER (Jul. 3, 2014), http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/
Dominica-moving-to-cut-ties-with-Privy-Council-17081906 (reporting that that
Dominica’s legislature has approved legislation to replace the Privy Council with the
Caribbean Court of Justice).
39. The Jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, U.K. JUDICIAL COMM.
OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL, http://www.jcpc.uk/docs/jcpc_jurisdiction_map.pdf (last
visited July 23, 2014).
40. Beginner’s Guide to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE U.K. 3 (Mar. 31, 2014), https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/begin-
ners-guide-to-the-jcpc.pdf.
41. See Tolulope Monisola Oya & Johnson Olusegun Ajayi, Values Clarifications in Mar-
ital Rape: A Nigerian Situation, 9 EUR. SCI. J. 291 (2013) (contending that spousal
rape is legal in Nigeria and noting that it is the African Yoruba value for a wife to be
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the impact of the transatlantic slave trade in the Caribbean differentiate the
Caribbean colonial experience from the Nigerian colonial experience, where
the policy of indirect rule during the colonial period made it more likely
that tribal norms and culture would remain intact.42
The prevalence of spousal rape in modern day Nigeria has been attrib-
uted to traditional African Yoruba norms regarding the role of women,
which were to some extent in accord with British colonial norms on spousal
rape.43 And while such values regarding the role of women may have made
their way over to the Caribbean via the transatlantic slave trade, a tool of
colonialism, the impact of the transatlantic slave trade in the Caribbean
impedes making a direct connection between such traditional pre-colonial
African values and the modern day spousal rape laws in the Caribbean.
What is much clearer is the imposition of colonial norms through the “doc-
trine of reception,” the explicit retention of common law and British stat-
utes adopted prior to independence, and the wholesale preservation of
common law spousal rape rules through the adoption of various statutes in
the Caribbean. These facts illustrate the value and insights of postcolonial
theory.
Additionally, one could contend that the retention of the spousal rape
exemption may be due in part to pre-colonial culture in the Common-
wealth Caribbean. While this argument may have some merit, the extent to
which pre-colonial values in the Caribbean influences modern day Carib-
bean dynamics may be limited due to the genocide of the indigenous popu-
lation during the sixteenth century.44
The concept of subalterneity is central in postcolonial studies.45 Subal-
tern “refers to the various hierarchies which existed within the colonized
world—that is, within the ‘native’ population.”46 In her research on colonial
submissive to her husband and such values may be responsible for the prevalence of
spousal rape in Nigeria).
42. See Stacy-Ann Elvy, Towards a New Democratic Africa: The African Charter on De-
mocracy, Elections and Governance, 27 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 41 (2013) (discussing
the impact of indirect rule in Africa, which utilized existing tribal structures to facili-
tate British dominance); see also Christian Dippel, Institutional Change and Elite Per-
spectives: The 19th Century Caribbean Colonies (May 16, 2012), available at http://
www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty/christian.dippel/BWI_cc_paper03.pdf (discussing
the evolution of direct colonial rule in British Caribbean colonies).
43. Oya & Ajayi, supra note 41, at 303.
44. See ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
(1982) for Caribbean sociologist Orlando Patterson’s contention that there were over
a million native Indians in the Caribbean prior to Columbus’ arrival, but by 1550
only two hundred and fifty native Indians remained in the Caribbean, while in Ja-
maica the Arawak population was completely eliminated within a decade.
45. Roy, supra note 19, at 342.
46. Id. at 342–43.
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women in India, postcolonial theorist Gayatri Spivak contends that patri-
archy and colonialism have both been used simultaneously to oppress and
control the “subaltern sexed subject, or brown woman.”47 The ideology of
British patriarchy, which was grounded in notions of respectability and do-
mesticity, created a plethora of restrictive norms regarding the role of
women in society. Patriarchy is a cultured construct that facilitates the pro-
duction of gendered norms and creates a system of female exploitation.
At common law, women were chattel, owned first by their fathers and
then by their husbands; a husband could not be held criminally responsible
for raping his own chattel. This concept was incorporated into British com-
mon law through the spousal rape exemption, which prevented a husband
from being prosecuted for raping his wife.48 British common law facilitated
the perpetuation of the superiority of the male identity over the female
identity. For instance, under the common law, married women had little or
no right to enter into contracts or sue, and a husband had control over his
wife’s property.49 British patriarchy provoked the development of four justi-
fications for affording husbands freedom from prosecution if they engaged
in forced sexual intercourse with their wives: (1) the implied consent theory,
(2) the unities theory, (3) the property theory, and (4) the privacy and
reconciliation theories. All of these theories implicate principles of contract
law, property law, criminal law, and family law.
B. Implied Consent Theory
The implied consent theory, or irretractable consent theory, was the
most commonly endorsed justification for the spousal rape exemption.50
This theory was the first justification offered in support of the spousal rape
exemption.51 Sir William Hale, a former Chief Justice of the Court of the
King’s Bench in England,52 explained in his treatise that “the husband can-
not be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by
their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up her-
47. Id. at 345; see also Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in THE
POST-COLONIAL STUDIES READER 28 (Bill Ashcroft et al. eds., 1995).
48. CARINGELLA, supra note 2, at 20.
49. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88
CALIF. L. REV. 1373, 1387–88 (2000); see also, Richard Chused, Married Women’s
Property Law: 1800–1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359, 1361 (1983) (stating that at the
beginning of the nineteenth century husbands had control of the property of their
wives).
50. Anne C. Dailey, Note, To Have and to Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1256 (April 1986).
51. Id. at 1255.
52. Hasday, supra note 49, at 1396.
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self in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract.”53 A marriage
was embodied in a contract, and “the terms of this contract include[d] a
wife’s irrevocable consent to have sexual intercourse with her husband,
whenever he wishes.”54
Any sexual intercourse between husband and wife after the wife pro-
vided initial consent in their marriage contract was deemed consensual and
thus could not constitute rape. To the extent that women were deemed to
have given irrevocable consent to sexual intercourse, female submission to
sexual intercourse was required. According to Anne McClintock, “control-
ling women’s sexuality . . . was widely perceived as a paramount means for
controlling the health and wealth of the male imperial body.”55 Thus, the
law played a central role in restricting female sexual autonomy in an effort
to facilitate British imperialism.
C. Unities Theory
The second justification provided in support of the spousal rape ex-
emption was the unities theory, which was derived from the feudal doctrine
of coverture, the legal unity of a husband and a wife.56 William Blackstone
described the theory in his Commentaries: “By marriage, the husband and
wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the
woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and
consolidated into that of the husband.”57 Under this theory, a woman
ceased to retain her identity once she was married; a husband assumed his
wife’s civil identity and was given wide-ranging control over her.58 Women
were not recognized as separate persons from their husbands and therefore
“marital rape [was] impossible because a husband [was] not capable of rap-
ing himself.”59 In his commentaries, Blackstone contended that women
were inferior to men.60 This presumption facilitated the establishment of
the third and fourth theories that justified the spousal rape exemption: the
property theory and the privacy and reconciliation theories.61
53. MATTHEW HALE, The History of the Pleas of the Crown 629 (Robert H. Small ed.,
1847) (1736).
54. Lalenya Weintraub Siegel, The Marital Rape Exemption: Evolution to Extinction, 43
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351, 354 (1995).
55. ANNE MCCLINTOCK, IMPERIAL LEATHER: RACE, GENDER, AND SEXUALITY IN THE
COLONIAL CONTEST 47 (1995); see also GANDHI, supra note 20, at 98.
56. Dailey, supra note 50.
57. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *442.
58. Hasday, supra note 49, at 1389.
59. Theresa Fus, Note, Criminalizing Marital Rape: A Comparison of Judicial and Legisla-
tive Approaches, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 481, 483 (2006).
60. BLACKSTONE, supra note 57, at *444.
61. Dailey, supra note 50.
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D. Property Theory
Under the property theory, a woman became her husband’s property
once they were married. As a result, husbands had substantial authority over
their wives.62 The common law reflected this notion in that rape law in
general was treated “as a property crime of man against man,” rather than as
a violation against women.63 Prior to marriage, a woman was the property
of her father; rape laws thus existed to protect both a father’s interest in his
daughter’s virginity, as well as a husband’s interest in his wife’s fidelity.64
Since a husband could not commit a crime against himself by taking what
he already owned, “a husband was no more capable of raping his [own] wife
than an owner was of stealing his own property.”65 Sexual intercourse be-
tween a husband and a wife could never constitute rape, because the hus-
band would merely be “making appropriate use of his property.”66 Viewing
women as property stems from the assumption that women are inherently
weak, emotional, and infantile, and are therefore in need of direction that
only a husband or father can provide. Similarly, one of the major justifica-
tions for European colonialism was the alleged infantile and primitive na-
ture of indigenous populations.67 The property theory is perhaps rooted in
the concept of submissiveness of women. It is because women were also
viewed as the property of their husbands or fathers that they were perceived
to lack the ability to make independent decisions.
E. Modern Privacy and Reconciliation Theories
During the Victorian era, “privacy meant keeping people out of one’s
own business [and] the domestic fortress was privacy’s stronghold.”68 Under
the common law, a husband had legal and physical control over his wife,
and the law protected a husband’s right to exert such control without intru-
62. Hasday, supra note 49, at 1389.
63. Dailey, supra note 50 (quoting S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 8 (1975)); see
R. TONG, WOMEN, SEX, AND THE LAW 90 (1984).
64. Id.
65. Siegel, supra note 54, at 356.
66. Adamo, supra note 8, at 560.
67. John L. Comaroff, Colonialism, Culture, and the Law: A Foreword, 26 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 305, 310 (2001).
68. DEBORAH COHEN, FAMILY SECRETS: SHAME AND PRIVACY IN MODERN BRITAIN
3–4 (2013). Cohen contends that the ideal of domestic privacy was well established
in Britain by the eighteenth century. Id.; see also SIMON SZRETER & KATE FISHER,
SEX BEFORE THE SEXUAL REVOLUTION: INTIMATE LIFE IN ENGLAND, 1918–1963
(2010) (contending that from 1918 through 1963 privacy was at the center of mari-
tal relationships in Britain and describing the various ways in which marital privacy
was understood during this period).
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sion.69 A husband could subject his wife to corporal punishment; authorities
would intrude on the sanctity of marriage only where a husband caused
permanent physical injury to his wife.70 The concept of marital privacy is to
some extent rooted in the doctrine of coverture. The law protected a hus-
band’s ability to exercise his legal right to control his wife within the con-
fines of marriage. According to Blackstone, the law considered spouses to be
a single person, with the wife submitting herself to her husband, and upon
marriage, a husband would adequately protect his wife’s interests.71 Thus,
the interests of the husband were viewed as identical to the interests of the
wife under the unities theory. Modern-day notions of marital privacy, like
the unities theory, “assume the aligned interests of husband and wife.”72
The right to marital privacy and the goal of marital reconciliation have
been used to justify the spousal rape exemption.73 Under the privacy theory,
failing to prosecute a husband for raping his wife prevented governmental
intrusion, protected marital privacy, and promoted reconciliation between
spouses.74 Upon marriage, “the curtain is drawn: the public stays out and
the spouses stay in.”75 If a husband were prosecuted for raping his wife, the
public could review the intimate acts of a married couple, which would
violate the couple’s right to marital privacy.76 Under the reconciliation the-
ory, one spouse should not be able to waive the right to marital privacy
without the other spouse’s consent.77 Spouses are incentivized to resolve
their problems without outside interference, which facilitates mutual respect
between the spouses.78 Under the reconciliation theory, the ability of mar-
ried couples to reconcile would be greatly decreased if spouses were permit-
ted to access the criminal justice system to resolve all of their marital
disputes.79
69. BLACKSTONE, supra note 57, at *442.
70. Hasday, supra note 49, at 1389; see also Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife
Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2118 (1996) (suggesting that
nineteenth-century judges refused to intervene in wife beating cases to protect mari-
tal privacy and promote marital harmony).
71. BLACKSTONE, supra note 57, at *444.
72. Hasday, supra note 49, at 1380.
73. Id.
74. See Michael Gary Hilf, Marital Privacy and Spousal Rape, 16 NEW ENG. L. REV. 31,
34–40 (1980).
75. Id. at 34.
76. See id. at 34–36.
77. See id. at 34.
78. See id.
79. See id.
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F. Doctrine of Reception and the Imposition of
British Norms and Legal Rules
Law is “both a producer of culture and an object of culture.”80 Law
“shapes individual and group identity, social practices as well as the mean-
ing of cultural symbols, but all of these things (culture in its myriad mani-
festations) also shape law by changing what is socially desirable, politically
feasible, [and] legally legitimate.”81 Thus, law creates culture, and cultural
practices can create law. The process of controlling colonial territories
through colonial laws has been referred to as “lawfare” rather than “war-
fare.”82 Law was central to the process of colonization.83 John Camaroff
contends that the term “colonial law” refers to “an irreducibly diverse en-
semble of practices and institutions [where] cultures of legality were consti-
tutive of colonial society [and] . . . colonies were prime sites of sociolegal
experimentation.”84
Postcolonial theorists have “endeavored to show that the ideological
effects of colonial laws continue to have contemporary relevance as they
continue to be used as an instrument of control in [the] postcolonial
world.”85 However, it is often difficult to identify the exact moment at
which colonial values regarding the respective roles of men and women be-
came embedded within the various structures of postcolonial states.86
During the colonial period, the British used the colonial doctrine of
reception to impose British common law, norms, justifications, and statutes
on Commonwealth Countries,87 including the norms regarding conjugal re-
lations in marriage and “the science of domesticity” and respectability.88 In
80. Naomi Mezey, Law as Culture, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 35, 46 (2001).
81. Id.
82. Comaroff, supra note 67, at 306.
83. See id. at 305.
84. Id. at 312.
85. Roy, supra note 19, at 319.
86. M. Jacqui Alexander, Not Just (Any) Body Can be a Citizen: The Politics of Law,
Sexuality and Postcoloniality in Trinidad and Tobago and the Bahamas, 48 FEMINIST
REV., Autumn 1994, at 11.
87. See Jane Matthews Glen, Mixed Jurisdictions in the Commonwealth Caribbean: Mix-
ing, Unmixing, Remixing, 12 ELEC. J. COMP. L., May 2008, at 4 (discussing the
doctrine of reception as the English common law of colonization and its role as the
process in which British law was adopted in the Commonwealth Caribbean); BLACK-
STONE, supra note 57, at *107 (discussing the imposition of English common law on
settled territories: settlers  were presumed to have brought with them English norms,
common law, and statutes already in existence, although laws of conquered or ceded
territories generally remained in place until the laws were changed by the English or
colonial legislatures directly adopted English laws).
88. Alexander, supra note 86, at 12.
108 M I C H I G A N  J O U R N A L  O F  G E N D E R &  L A W [Vol. 22:89
the Caribbean, the colonized were socialized to accept these colonial
norms.89
After Commonwealth Countries gained independence, postcolonial
masculinity emerged, in part by upholding the British principles regarding
domestic respectability, conjugal relations, and the role of women.90
Postcolonial masculinity aspired to imitate imperial masculinity in an effort
to be viewed as legitimate and worthy of independent rule.91 Common-
wealth Countries have continued to perpetuate colonial ideologies regarding
masculinity, respectability, and femininity.92 Postcolonial Commonwealth
Countries continue to rely on colonial “constructions of a servile feminin-
ity, perennially willing and able to serve.”93
During the independence period, postcolonial Caribbean leaders
openly lauded their continued reliance on British traditions. Norman Man-
ley, one of Jamaica’s leading political figures of that time, asserted that Ja-
maica made “no apology for the fact that [it] did not attempt to embark
upon any original or novel exercise for constitution building because [it]
had a system which [Jamaicans] underst[ood] . . . and which [was] consis-
tent with the sort of ideals [held]in this country.”94 Similarly, Dominica’s
Premier openly acknowledged that the country intended to follow “in the
noble British tradition . . . by evolution rather than revolution . . . [and]
intended to base [its] progress on continuity, taking from past [British] in-
stitutions.”95 The approach taken in the Caribbean, in favor of evolution
rather than revolution, is somewhat distinct from the revolutionary fight for
89. See id. at 13 (“[S]chools like the Dundas Civic Center in the Bahamas . . . and the
Trinidad and Tobago Home Industries and Women’s Self Help Organiza-
tion . . . would train Black women in housewifery, cooking, sewing and knitting.”).
90. See id. at 13.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 14.
93. Id. at 19; see also Push for Greater Gender Equality!, THE GLEANER (Sept. 30, 2012),
http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20120930/focus/focus6.html (“Regardless of so-
cial position, women continue to bear the brunt of domestic responsibilities, includ-
ing the nurture and care of children and the elderly” and women are overwhelming
concentrated in the lowest paying sectors of the economy); Jamaica, Internat’l La-
bour Org. (Oct. 2009), http://www.ilo.org/caribbean/countries-covered/jamaica/
lang—en/index.htm (women account for only 31.1% of the Jamaican labor force
while men make up 68.9%). But see Jamaica Nat’l Pol’y for Gender Equality (2011),
http://www.jcdc.gov.jm/uploads/advisories/NPGE%20BOOKLET%20web.pdf (in-
dicating the Jamaican government’s dedication to promoting gender balance be-
tween men and women).
94. Tracy Robinson, Gender, Nation and the Common Law Constitution, 28 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 735, 740 (2008).
95. Id.
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independence taken by former colonies in Africa, such as Kenya, Angola,
and Guinea-Bissau.96
Postcolonial theorist Frantz Fanon asserts that during specific phases
of postcolonial development, postcolonial subjects often attempt to create a
national postcolonial culture that is distinct from the culture of their colo-
nizers.97 However, in the process, postcolonial subjects may fail to realize
that they continue to use instruments and principles borrowed from their
colonizers.98 Fanon argues that at this phase in postcolonial development,
the postcolonial subject “contents himself with stamping
the . . . instruments [of his colonizer] with a hall-mark which he wishes to
be national, but which is strangely reminiscent of exoticism.”99
A postcolonial reading of the laws of Commonwealth Countries indi-
cates that many of these countries continue to rely heavily on British case
law and statutes when creating and operating their own legal systems. The
independence constitutions of Commonwealth Countries preserved a Brit-
ish colonial identity by retaining the British Privy Council as the final court
of appeals.100 These constitutions often included a “savings clause” that up-
held the validity of any law, including common law, that existed prior to
independence until these laws were either repealed or revised by the legisla-
ture.101 The British Privy Council has historically adopted a narrow inter-
pretation of savings clauses, which assumed that fundamental rights and
freedoms were derived from the common law rather than the constitu-
tion.102 Only rights that were recognized by the common law before the
96. MHD Noor Al-Abbood, Native Culture and Literature under Colonialism: Fanon’s
Theory of Native Resistance and Development, 2 ENG. LANGUAGE & LIT. STUD. 121,
126–30 (2012).
97. See FRANTZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH 222–23 (Constance Farring-
ton trans., Grove Press 1963) (1961) (discussing the revolutionary phase of colonial
literature).
98. Id. at 223.
99. Id.
100. ANT. & BARB. CONST., sched. 2 ¶ 3; BAH. CONST., ch. 3, art. 31; BARB. CONST.,
ch. VI, §§ 76, 77; see also Helfer, supra note 15, at 1865.
101. See Derek O’Brien & Se-shauna Wheatle, The Commonwealth Caribbean and the
Uses and Abuses of Comparative Constitutional Law, U.K. CONST. LAW ASS’N (Nov.
22, 2011), http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/tag/savings-clauses/; JAM. CONST., art.
26(8). The savings clause in the Jamaican constitution provides “nothing contained
in any law in force immediately before the appointed day shall be held to be incon-
sistent with any of the provisions of this Chapter; and nothing done under the au-
thority of any such law shall be held to be done in contravention of any of these
provisions.” Id.
102. Robinson, supra note 94, at 744; see also DPP v. Nasralla, [1967] 2 A.C. 238–39
(P.C.) (appeal taken from Jam.) (adopting a narrow view of the savings law clause in
the Jamaican constitution).
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effective date of the constitution were constitutionally protected.103 Thus, in
some instances, savings clauses immunized laws from constitutional scru-
tiny, as claims by plaintiffs asserting violations of fundamental rights under
state constitutions were defeated by government assertions that the common
law did not guarantee such rights prior to independence.104
Commonwealth Caribbean reliance upon British statutory law, British
common law, and the British Privy Council was, to some extent, necessary
to maintain a functional legal system immediately after independence. In
fact, many countries, including the United States and Canada, continue to
rely on British common law. However, unlike most Commonwealth Coun-
tries, the United States does not rely on the British Privy Council as the
final court of appeals. Similarly, Canada created its own Supreme Court in
1875 and abolished the right to appeals in criminal cases to the British Privy
Council in 1888.105 New Zealand abolished the right to appeals to the Brit-
103. ROSE-MARIE B. ANTOINE, COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN LAW AND LEGAL SYS-
TEMS 101–02 (2006).
104. Robinson supra note 94, at 744.
105. Bryan Finlay, Q.C. & Frank E. Walwyn, WeirFoulds LLP, “Such As They Are, They
Are Our Own”: A Talk on Abolishing Canadian Appeals to the Privy Council, Pres-
entation to the Judicial Education Institute of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court
(Feb. 8, 2008); see also John S. Jeremie S.C., The Privy Council and the Caribbean,
129 L.Q.R. 169 (2013); Dr. Nadia Bernaz, Delivering Justice in the Caribbean: A
Human Rights Assessment of the Caribbean Court of Justice, P.L. 2012, 703 (Oct.
2012) (Eng.); Derek O’Brien, The Caribbean Court of Justice and Its Appellate Juris-
diction: A Difficult Birth, P.L. 2006, 344 (2006) (Eng.). Commonwealth Countries
are indeed free to replace the Privy Council with the CCJ, but very few of these
countries have done so. The reasons for the failure to do away with the Privy Coun-
cil are varied. Many arguments have been put forward for retaining the Privy Coun-
cil. For example, the political distance of the Privy Council is viewed as advantageous
because it  supposedly allows decisions to be decided objectively. Helfer, supra note
15, at 1867. The Privy Council, which is paid for by Britain, also has a long history
of demonstrating its competence to decide cases on Caribbean issues. Id. Often,
political parties cannot reach a consensus on the issue, despite the many arguments
in favor of replacing the Privy Council. See Alicia Dunkley, CCJ All The Way, JA-
MAICA OBSERVER (May 11, 2012), http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/CCJ-all-
the-way_11438687; AJ Nicholson, Six Reasons Why There’s No Need for Privy Coun-
cil, CCJ Referendum, JAMAICA OBSERVER (June 25, 2012), http://www.jamaicaob-
server.com/news/Six-reasons-why-there-s-no-need-for-Privy-Council—CCJ-
referendum_11790305. In other cases, the Privy Council invalidates the actions of
the legislative branch. Jamaica once attempted to replace the Privy Council with the
CCJ by adoption of three statutes that passed by a simple majority in the House.
Indep. Jam. Council for Human Rights (1998) Ltd. v. Marshall-Burnett, [2005]
Appeal No. 41 of 2004, 2005 WL 62301 at *1–2 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Jam.).
The Privy Council held the statutes unconstitutional due to the Jamaican govern-
ment’s failure to follow appropriate constitutional procedures for replacing the Privy
Council with the CCJ. Id. at *9. The Privy Council reasoned that although the right
of appeal was not entrenched in the Jamaican Constitution, the structure of the
2015] A  P O S T C O L O N I A L  T H E O R Y  O F  S P O U S A L  R A P E 111
ish Privy Council in 2004.106 Additionally, in contrast to the United States,
most Commonwealth Countries have adopted the British Westminster sys-
tem of government.107 Although other former British colonial territories,
such as Australia, have adopted the Westminster system, Australia abolished
the right of appeal to the British Privy Council in 1986.108 Commonwealth
Countries are bound to follow British Privy Council decisions from their
own jurisdictions; however, in many instances, the courts of Common-
wealth Countries are also willing to follow British Privy Council precedent
that originates from other jurisdictions.109 For instance, Pratt v. Morgan,
discussed in Part IV below, originated in Jamaica and interpreted Jamaican
constitutional provisions, but many other Commonwealth Countries, in-
cluding Trinidad and Tobago, have considered themselves to be bound by
this decision.110 Caribbean scholars have contended that Commonwealth
Caribbean law is British law, as the statutes adopted by many Caribbean
countries are often simply codifications of colonial British rules, particularly
in the area of criminal law. These countries rarely update their laws to re-
appeals courts in Jamaica, including the independence of their judiciary, was en-
trenched in the Constitution. Id. at *8. Amendments to an entrenched provision
require a period of at least six months between introduction of the bill in a House
and its passing, and the bill must pass in each House by no less than two-thirds of all
members of that House. Id. at *5. Public opinion in Britain appears to favor elimi-
nating the Privy Council for independent countries such as Commonwealth Coun-
tries. See Roy Hattersley, Let’s Abolish this Absurdity, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 13, 2000,
10:12 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2000/dec/14/monarchy.comment; see
also Privy Council’s Complaint, BBC CARIBBEAN (Sept. 24, 2009, 7:20 AM), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/caribbean/news/story/2009/09/090922_privyccjphillips.shtml (dis-
cussing Lord Nicholas Phillip’s opinion that the Privy Council was spending a dis-
proportionate amount of time on appeals from former colonies in the Caribbean and
that these countries should establish their own final appeals courts instead).
106. Supreme Court Act 2003 (N.Z.). Other former British Colonies such as India, Ma-
laysia, Singapore, and Zimbabwe have also eliminated the right to appeal to the
British Privy Council. Andrew Le Sueur, Unit Report, What is the Future for the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council?, UNIV. COLL. LONDON, SCH. PUB. POLICY,
CONST. UNIT, at 6 (May 2001), http://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/publications/unit-publi-
cations/72.pdf.
107. See Winton Anderson, The Role of the Caribbean Court of Justice in Human Rights
Adjudication: International Treaty Law Dimensions, 21 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1,
5–6 (2011-2012).
108. Australia Act 1986 (Cth) s 11(1).
109. ANTOINE, supra note 103, at 141–42, 149–51. Some Caribbean scholars contend
that Privy Council decisions from other jurisdictions should not be treated as bind-
ing, but rather be viewed as persuasive legal authority even where the laws and cir-
cumstances are similar. Id.
110. Id. at 149–51.
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flect modern-day changes to British law.111 Even the titles of the spousal
rape statutes of Commonwealth Countries has colonial origins; these stat-
utes are titled after the Sexual Offences Act adopted in Britain in 1956.112
The explicit wholesale preservation of the common law by Caribbean
constitutions, the retention of the British Privy Council as the final court of
appeals, and the failure to develop a distinct Commonwealth Caribbean
jurisprudence tailored to the needs of the Caribbean, separate and apart
from British Privy Council case law,113 evidence the extent to which a Brit-
ish colonial identity continues to exist in Commonwealth Countries.
In the famous 1991 case of R v. R, the United Kingdom House of
Lords abolished the spousal rape exemption.114 The court reasoned that the
status and role of married women in modern-day England had changed
since the publication of Sir William Hale’s treatise in 1736.115 The House
of Lords specifically rejected Hale’s proposition that a married woman pro-
vided her husband with irrevocable consent to sexual intercourse.116 The
court held that “in modern times the supposed marital exception in rape
forms no part of the law of England.”117 The court also acknowledged that
the implied consent theory was a reflection of restrictive cultural views to-
ward women in the eighteenth century.118
The laws of Commonwealth Countries continue to reflect the
gendered justifications and binary oppositions embedded within the com-
mon law, which facilitate female subjectivity and objectivity. The attempt
by the Bahamian legislature in 2009 to eliminate the spousal rape exemp-
tion provides an illustration of the maintenance of the historical gendered
justifications used to perpetuate the common law spousal rape exemption.
At a panel discussion on the proposed Bahamian bill, a “woman, who did
not provide her identity while speaking, said that it is not possible for a man
to rape his wife. She said that she makes herself available to her husband
111. P.K. Menon, The Law of Rape and Criminal Law Administration with Special Refer-
ence to the Commonwealth Caribbean, 32 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 832, 839 (1983).
112. Id. at 836.
113. David S. Berry & Tracy Robinson, Introduction to TRANSITIONS IN CARIBBEAN
LAW: LAW-MAKING, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE CONVERGENCE OF NATIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, xiii (David S. Berry & Tracy Robinson eds., 2013) (ar-
guing that much of the Commonwealth Caribbean courts continue to rely heavily
on British cases and statutes to the detriment of the creation of a distinct Common-
wealth Caribbean jurisprudence).
114. R v. R, [1991] UKHL 12, [1992] 1 A.C. 599 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
115. R v. R [1991] UKHL at 12.
116. R v. R [1991] UKHL at 12.
117. R v. R [1991] UKHL at 12.
118. R v. R [1991] UKHL at 12.
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whenever he desires sex, claiming that her body is ‘his body.’”119 The bill,
which was supported by the Archdiocese of Nassau and the Anglican
Church in the Bahamas, but which was opposed by the Bahamas Christian
Council,120 was eventually tabled.121
The CEDAW Committee has expressed concern regarding the persis-
tence of strong patriarchal attitudes and deep-rooted stereotypes regarding
the roles, responsibilities, and identities of women and men in Jamaica.122
The CEDAW Committee has recommended that Jamaica adopt a compre-
hensive strategy to eliminate cultural practices that discriminate against
women.123
Women in Caribbean countries continue to be subject to high levels
of sexual abuse.124 A survey of young adults in Barbados, Jamaica, and Trini-
dad and Tobago found that between 52% and 73% of women reported
experiences of sexual violence at the hands of a partner.125 Reports from
various United Nations programs, including UNICEF and the annual U.S.
State Department Country Reports on Commonwealth Countries, indicate
119. Anthony L. Hall, Banning Marital Rape in The Bahamas, THE IPINIONS JOURNAL,
(Aug. 14, 2009), http://www.theipinionsjournal.com/2009/08/banning-marital-
rape-in-the-bahamas/.
120. Lisa Benjamin & Cathleen LeGrand, Sound and Fury: Newspaper Coverage of the
Marital Rape Debate in New Providence, 18 INT’L J. BAHAMIAN STUD. 16, 29–30
(2012). Archbishop Patrick Pinder supported the 2009 proposed bill to fully
criminalize spousal rape and stated that “woman and man exist in a partnership
where one partner completes the other, making the relationship one of complemen-
tarity and not ownership [therefore] no person can be the possession of another.
Human dignity does not allow this. When an individual is forced to engage in sexual
activity against his or her will then the perpetrator does violence to the dignity and
value of the human person created in the image and likeness of God.” Bahamas
Church Backs Marital Rape Bill, CATHOLIC NEWS (Trin. & Tobago), (Sept. 10,
2009, 3:27 PM), http://www.catholicnews-tt.net/joomla/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=858:car130909-1&catid=35:caribbean-news&Itemid=93.
121. See Taneka Thompson, McCartney Clarifies Position on Marital Rape Issue, NASSAU
GUARDIAN (Mar.23, 2012), http://www.thenassauguardian.com/index.php?option=
com_content&view=article&id=27326:mccartney-clarifies-position-on-marital-rape-
issue&catid=3:news&Itemid=27.
122. Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 36th
Sess., Aug. 7, 2006-Aug. 25, 2006, pt. 3 at 230, U.N. Doc. A/61/38; GAOR, 61st
Sess., Supp. No. 38 (Aug. 25, 2006).
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Elsie Le Franc et al., Interpersonal Violence in Three Caribbean Countries:
Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad & Tobago, 24 PAN. AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 409, 409
(2008) (out of the 3,401 women between the ages of 15–30 at varying levels of
socioeconomic development surveyed, 70.9% reported victimization by some form
of violence, with 62.8% of those reporting violence saying it was perpetrated by a
relationship partner).
125. Id. at 414.
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that sexual violence against women, including spousal abuse, is a significant
problem in the Caribbean.126
A study of sexual violence in Jamaica concluded that 58.3% of sur-
veyed women reported that they had experienced physical violence by
males, and 76% of women indicated that they had been subjected to sexual
coercion.127 In 62.8% of all sexual violence cases against women in Barba-
dos, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, a relationship partner was the per-
petrator.128 The study concluded that Jamaica had the highest rate of sexual
violence when compared to Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago: 57.2% of
Jamaican women have reported that they experienced sexual coercion while
in a relationship.129 Moreover, “the very high levels of reported [intimate
partner violence] indicate very high levels of tolerance among victims, and
suggest that a culture of violence and adversarial intimate relationships may
be well entrenched.”130 In the study, male respondents in Barbados viewed
domestic quarrels as a challenge from their partner to be overcome and a
“war to be won.” Not surprisingly, negotiation and compromise were not
the preferred methods of conflict resolution.131 This data indicates that sex-
ual violence against women is a prevalent problem in Commonwealth
Countries. The sustained prevalence of patriarchal attitudes, which promote
discrimination against women and infringe on the sexual autonomy of
women, continues to enable the double colonization of Caribbean women.
These persistent inequalities are not due solely to the imposition of British
norms during the colonial period; Commonwealth Countries have since
126. Lorraine Blank, Situation Analysis of Children and Women in Ten Countries in the
Caribbean Region, UNICEF EASTERN CARIBBEAN 22 (Feb. 7, 2007), http://www
.unicef.org/lac/spbarbados/Implementation/SP%20Poverty/Regional/sitan_2007.pdf
(indicating that high levels of sexual violence in the Caribbean negatively impact the
realization of the goals of CEDAW); Joint Report, U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime
& World Bank, Latin America and Carribean Region, Crime, Violence, and Devel-
opment: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean, 12 (Mar. 2007), http:/
/www.unodc.org/pdf/research/Cr_and_Vio_Car_E.pdf (finding women in Carib-
bean countries experience a higher rate of rape than the unweighted average of 102
countries; Immigration & Refugee Bd. of Can., Saint Lucia: Sexual Violence Against
Women, Including Legislation, State Protection and Support Services Available to Vic-
tims (2009-October 2012), REFWORLD (Nov. 15 2012), http://www.refworld.org/
docid/50bf2f292.html (reporting Saint Lucia’s rate of rape at approximately 38 per
100,000 people in 2009 and 41 per 100,000 people in 2010); see, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of
State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights & Labor, Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices for 2013: Antigua and Barbuda (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.state
.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dlid=220413.
127. Le Franc et al., supra note 124, at 414.
128. Id. at 409.
129. Id. at 414
130. Id. at 409.
131. Id. at 417.
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adopted statutes to explicitly retain their colonial inheritance. As the follow-
ing section will note, contemporary legislation continues to reflect many of
the common law justifications for spousal rape.
III. SEXUAL OFFENCES STATUES132
A. Standard Spousal Rape Conditions
Although the famous R v. R case eliminated the common law spousal
rape exemption in Britain in 1991,133 it failed to affect Commonwealth
Caribbean law because many Commonwealth Countries had already passed
legislation that superseded the common law spousal rape rule.134 Rather
than eliminating the spousal rape exemption, Commonwealth Countries
have retained a modified form of the spousal rape exemption. The spousal
rape statutes of Commonwealth Countries generally provide that a husband
who has sexual intercourse with his wife without her consent cannot be
prosecuted for rape unless a decree nisi of divorce, a separation order, a
separation agreement, or a protective order has been issued prior to, and is
still in place at the time of, the rape (“Standard Spousal Rape
Conditions”).135
Between 1989 and 1991, CARICOM drafted a series of model legisla-
tion, including the model legislation on sexual offences, aimed at protecting
the rights of women in the Caribbean.136 Like the sexual offences laws of
Commonwealth Countries, CARICOM’s model legislation on sexual of-
fences (“CARICOM Model Law”) also requires that the Standard Spousal
Rape Conditions be satisfied to criminalize spousal rape.137
132. Oftentimes, statutes of Commonwealth Countries use the British spelling of the
word “offenses.” See, e.g., Sexual Offences Act (Act 9/1995) (Ant. & Barb.).
133. R v. R, [1991] UKHL 12.
134. GEMMA TANG NAIN & BARBARA EVELYN BAILEY, CARICOM SECRETARIAT, GEN-
DER EQUALITY IN THE CARIBBEAN: REALITY OR ILLUSION 57 (2003).
135. See, e.g., Sexual Offences Act 1998, art. 3(3) (1998) (Dominica); Sexual Offences
Act 2009 (Act 12/2009), art. 5 (Jam.); Sexual Offences and Domestic Violence Act,
art. 3(4) (2002) (Barb.); Sexual Offences Act 1995 (Act 9/1995), art. 4 (Ant. &
Barb.); Sexual Offences & Domestic Violence Act, § 15 (2010) (Bah.); Criminal
Code of St. Lucia, art. 123(3) (2008). The Jamaican statute also includes an injunc-
tion for non-cohabitation or an order of ouster from the marital home. Sexual Of-
fences Act (Act 12/2009), art. 5 (Jam.).
136. See generally Caribbean Community Secretariat, Model Legislation on Issues Affecting
Women, CARICOM (Mar.1997), http://www.caricom.org/jsp/secretariat/legal_instru
ments/model_legislation_women_issues.jsp?menu=secretariat (last visited Apr. 18,
2014).
137. Caribbean Community Secretariat, CARICOM Model Legislation on Sexual Offences,
cl. 2, http://www.caricom.org/jsp/secretariat/legal_instruments/model_legislation_
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Although the Standard Spousal Rape Conditions can be found in the
statutes of every Commonwealth Country, some Commonwealth Countries
supplement these conditions by providing for additional circumstances that
may constitute spousal rape. For instance, the Bahamian statute (“Bahamian
Act”) provides that sexual assault by a husband can also occur if the hus-
band had intercourse with his wife without her consent and the husband
had notice that his wife filed a petition for judicial separation or divorce
prior to the assault.138 The Bahamian Act does not define the term “notice,”
nor does the Bahamian Penal Code provide guidance on the issue of notice
in the spousal rape context. Perhaps if a wife has served her husband with a
petition for divorce or separation, or if she can provide evidence that she
informed her husband that she filed for divorce or separation before the
sexual assault, she may be able to obtain judicial relief.
The Bahamian Act provides a complete consolidation of the sexual
offences subject to punishment.139 By adopting the Bahamian Act, law com-
missioners in the Bahamas explicitly hoped to reassert the central role of the
matrimonial home in the postcolonial state.140 As with other sexual offences
statutes adopted in other Commonwealth Countries, conjugal heterosexual-
ity in the Bahamian Sexual Offences Act was “frozen within a very specific
narrow set of class relations between husband and wife in marriage.”141 In
fact, even after the inclusion of the Standard Spousal Rape Conditions in
the Bahamian Act, many people in the Bahamas feared that women who
sought to exercise their rights under the new law would render men home-
less and nationless.142
Rather than conditioning prosecution on the violent acts committed
by a husband who has raped his wife, the Bahamian Act and the laws of
other Commonwealth Countries condition prosecution on the status of the
marriage prior to the rape. Spouses generally seek separation orders or pro-
tection orders or enter into separation agreements when marital discord is
high. The Standard Spousal Rape Conditions presupposes the existence of
sexual_offences.jsp (last visited Apr. 18, 2014) [hereinafter CARICOM Model
Legislation].
138. Sexual Offences & Domestic Violence Act, § 15(b) (2010) (Bah.). The Jamaican
statute also includes the initiation of dissolution proceedings in addition to the Stan-
dard Spousal Rape Conditions. Sexual Offences Act 2009 (Act 12/2009), art. 5
(Jam.).
139. Alexander, supra note 86, at 8.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 10.
142. M. Jacqui Alexander, Erotic Autonomy as a Politics of Decolonization: An Anatomy of
Feminist and State Practice in the Bahamas Tourist Economy, in FEMINIST GENEALO-
GIES, COLONIAL LEGACIES, DEMOCRATIC FUTURES 87 (M. Jacqui Alexander &
Chandra Talpade Mohanty eds., 1997).
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marital discord. A victim is unlikely to seek a decree nisi of divorce, separa-
tion order, or a separation agreement before being raped where there is no
prior history of marital disagreements or mental or physical abuse.
In addition to the Standard Spousal Rape Conditions, the Sexual Of-
fences Act of Jamaica (“Jamaican Act”) is notable in that it attempts to
address the prevalence of sexually transmitted diseases. The Jamaican Act
provides that a husband may also commit the act of spousal rape where “the
husband knows himself to be suffering from a sexually transmitted infec-
tion.”143 If a husband forces sexual intercourse upon his wife while knowing
he is infected with a sexually transmitted disease, the intercourse will consti-
tute spousal rape if the wife has not consented and the husband knows of or
recklessly disregards her lack of consent. HIV/AIDS has become the leading
cause of death among young adults in the Caribbean.144 A report issued by
the Jamaican Ministry of Health stated that “the greater the gender discrim-
ination in societies and the lower the position of women, the more nega-
tively they are affected by HIV [and] [t]herefore, more equal gender
relations and the empowerment of women are vital to successfully prevent
the spread of HIV infection and enable women to cope with HIV/
AIDS.”145 The sexual offences laws of other Commonwealth Countries, in-
cluding Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, and Dominica, fail to
address the relationship between spousal rape and sexually transmitted
diseases.
The following chart summarizes the spousal rape statutes in Com-
monwealth Countries:146
143. Sexual Offences Act 2009 (Act 12/2009), art. 5(3)(e) (Jam.).
144. The Ministry of Health & The Global Fund Jamaica, National HIV Aids Policy:
Jamaica, (May 2005), http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/population/aids/jamaica.aids.05
.pdf.
145. Id. at 14.
146. In addition to imposing the standard spousal rape conditions, these statutes also
require that the rape occur without the spouse’s consent. Sexual Offences Act 1998,
art. 3(3) (1998) (Dominica); Sexual Offences Act 2009 (Act 12/2009), art. 5(1)
(Jam.); Sexual Offences and Domestic Violence Act, art. 3(4) (2002) (Barb.); Sexual
Offences & Domestic Violence Act, art. 15(1) (2010) (Bah.); Criminal Code of St.
Lucia, art. 123(3) (2008). Some statutes also require that force or fear be used, while
others require that the perpetrator have knowledge of the lack of consent or act
recklessly as to whether the victim consented. Sexual Offences Act 1995 (Act 9/
1995), art. 4 (Ant. & Barb.);. Sexual Offences Act 1998, art. 3(3) (1998) (Domi-
nica). The CEDAW Committee has expressed concern regarding rape statutes that
require force in addition to consent. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women: Kyrgyzstan, 20th Sess., Jan. 19, 1999-Feb. 5, 1999,
¶ 122, U.N. Doc. A/54/38/Rev.1; GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 38 (Aug. 20,
1999); see also Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 46th
Sess., July 12, 2010-July 30, 2010, Comm’n No. 18/2008, ¶¶ 8.7-8.8(b)(1) & (ii),
118 M I C H I G A N  J O U R N A L  O F  G E N D E R &  L A W [Vol. 22:89
SPOUSAL RAPE SPOUSAL RAPE ALSO SPOUSAL RAPE ALSO
CRIMINALIZED IF CRIMINALIZED IF CRIMINALIZED IF
DECREE NISI OF HUSBAND HAD NOTICE HUSBAND KNOWS HE
DIVORCE, SEPARATION OF JUDICIAL PETITION SUFFERS FROM A
AGREEMENT, FOR SEPARATION, SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED
PROTECTIVE ORDER, OR DIVORCE, OR DISEASE OR IF
SEPARATION ORDER IS NULLIFICATION OF PROCEEDINGS TO
IN PLACE AT THE TIME MARRIAGE DISSOLVE MARRIAGE OR
OF THE RAPE PROCEEDINGS FOR
(STANDARD SPOUSAL DECREE OF NULLITY
RAPE CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN INITIATED
(“SSRC”))
Bahamas Bahamas Jamaica
Barbados
Jamaica
Dominica
Antigua and Barbuda
St. Lucia
B. Retention of Gendered Common Law Justifications
The common law justifications discussed in Part II of this Article ar-
guably aided in the perpetuation of the following restrictive norms regard-
ing the role of married women: women are objects to be controlled by their
husbands; women do not have control or autonomy over their own bodies,
as their bodies are first owned by their fathers and then subsumed within
their husbands’ legal identity upon marriage; marital privacy is more impor-
tant than a wife’s sexual autonomy; and a wife’s role is to be subservient to
her husband and, thus, irrevocable consent to sexual intercourse is given at
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/46/18/2008 (July 16, 2010) [hereinafter Vertido].  Some
statutes also provide that where the parties are in fact separated or are living apart at
the time of the rape or where a nullity of marriage or a peace order has been granted
and is in place at the time of the rape the husband may also be prosecuted for rape.
Criminal Code of St. Lucia, § 123(3)(c) (2008); Sexual Offences Act 2009, (Act 12/
2009), art. 5(3) (Jam.). In contrast to Commonwealth Countries, a number of states
in the U.S. have modified their rape laws to remove language that exempted spouses
from prosecution for spousal rape while other states have revised their laws to explic-
itly note that marriage is not a defense to rape prosecution. See, e.g., D.C. CODE
§ 22-3019 (Westlaw through Jan. 5, 2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.5201
(Westlaw through P.A. 2014, No. 556, 558–72, of the 2014 Reg. Sess.); MINN.
STAT. § 609.349 (Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); N.H. REV. STAT. § 632-a:5
(Westlaw through end of 2014 Reg. Sess.); N.J. STAT. § 2c:14-5 (Westlaw through
laws effective through L. 2014, c. 90 & J.R. No. 6); UTAH CODE § 76-5-402
(Westlaw through 2014 Gen. Sess.); VA. CODE § 18.2-61 (Westlaw through 2014
Reg. Sess.); WIS. STAT. § 940.225 (Westlaw through 2013 Act 20); see also Michelle
J. Anderson, Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships, and Improper Influences: A
New Law on Sexual Offences by Intimates, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1464, 1473 (2003)
(discussing U.S. spousal rape statutes).
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the time of marriage. The common law justifications for the spousal rape
exemption demonstrate how the common law has traditionally favored a
“socially embedded notion of masculinity” that facilitates the continued op-
pression of women.147 The common law historically distinguished between
subjects and objects:148 British men were subjects of the law, while women
and colonized individuals were objects of the law, “to be governed, con-
trolled [and] mastered.”149 Postcolonial theory seeks to identify and elimi-
nate this dualistic opposition between subject and object.150 Many of the
common law justifications established during the colonial period that were
used to justify the spousal rape exemption continue to underlie the modern-
day spousal rape statutes of Commonwealth Countries.
C. Retention of Implied Consent and Unities Justifications
Postcolonial theorists posit that physical differences, such as male and
female, and the ways in which individuals are viewed determine how they
will be treated under the law.151 Historically, the bodies of women have
been viewed as objects ripe for control. In the same way that British coloniz-
ers viewed their identities as superior to that of colonized people, British
common law viewed the masculine identity as superior to the feminine
identity. Women were viewed as feeble-minded individuals who lacked the
moral agency and competence to control their own bodies. In a 1953 deci-
sion, a British court held that a husband could not be found guilty of rape,
as a wife could only revoke her implied consent to marriage if a separation
order, separation agreement, or judicial order existed prior to the rape.152
Similarly in 1949, in R v. Clarke, the court held that a wife who had ob-
tained a separation order prior to being raped by her husband had revoked
her implied consent to sexual intercourse and so the husband could be pros-
ecuted for rape.153 The Standard Spousal Rape Conditions continue to re-
flect the implied consent justification for the spousal rape exemption. A
147. DAVIES, supra note 24, at 258.
148. Id. at 272.
149. Id. at 273.
150. Id. at 271.
151. BILL ASHCROFT ET AL., POST COLONIAL STUDIES: THE KEY CONCEPTS 10 (2d ed.
2008).
152. R v. Miller, [1953] 2 Q.B. 282 (Eng.). The wife had petitioned for a divorce based
on her husband’s alleged infidelities. Id. The court noted that, while the husband
could not be prosecuted for rape because the wife’s implied consent was not revoked,
he may be prosecuted for causing bodily harm because the wife’s implied consent to
sexual intercourse did not extend to violence. Id. at 291–92. See J.L. Barton, The
Story of Marital Rape, 108 L. Q. REV. 260 (1992), for a discussion of the history of
the spousal rape exemption in British case law.
153. R v. Clarke, (1949) 2 All E.R. 448 (Leeds Assizes).
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husband will only be prosecuted for raping his wife if steps are taken to
sever the marriage via a decree nisi of divorce, a separation order, a protec-
tive order, or a separation agreement, thereby, allowing a wife to revoke her
consent to sexual intercourse and retrieve her independent legal identity.
The implied consent theory continues to underlie discussions of
spousal rape in the Caribbean. For instance, in response to the proposed
amendment to fully criminalize spousal rape in Bahamas in 2009, the Baha-
mas Christian Council contended that it would
be tragically wrong [to criminalize spousal rape] because it
would. . . disregard. . . the marriage covenant and contract be-
tween a man and woman, when on the day of their marriage in
the sight of God and in the company of witnesses, they pledged
to give themselves to each other in holy matrimony and thereby
gave each other upfront implicit open-ended sexual consent.154
Similarly, one citizen claimed, “even if a woman says no to her hus-
band it still can’t be considered rape because she is his wife. He already paid
his dues at the church and she already said ‘I do,’ so from then on, even if [a
man] forces sex on his wife, it isn’t rape.”155 In Jamaica, Senator Lambert
Brown expressed his concern about proposals to remove the Standard
Spousal Rape Conditions from Jamaican law by stating
[T]he institution of marriage could lead to the filling out of a
form every night for consent [and] to now subject every sexual
activity to a potential future claim of rape is not something that
you will get me endorsing, and I don’t care how many conven-
tions we have signed importing from foreign things.156
The statutes of Commonwealth Countries create an irrational distinc-
tion between spousal rape and other acts of violence that occur within the
context of marriage. Under these statutes, a wife is presumed to have con-
sented to sexual intercourse with her husband unless one of the Standard
Spousal Rape Conditions has been satisfied. In contrast, a wife is not pre-
sumed to have given irrevocable consent to her husband for other acts of
154. Jasmin Bonimy, Marital Rape Ban Tragically Wrong, BAHAMAS CRISIS CENTRE (Sept.
7, 2009), http://crisiscentrebahamas.wordpress.com/2009/09/07/marital-rape-ban-
tragically-wrong-says-the-christian-council/.
155. See Cara Kulwicki, Bill in the Bahamas Attempts to Outlaw Spousal Rape, THE CUR-
VATURE (Aug. 22, 2009), http://thecurvature.com/2009/08/22/bill-in-the-bahamas-
attemps-to-outlaw-spousal-rape/ (citation omitted).
156. Senator Resists Proposal on Marital Rape, JAMAICA GLEANER (Oct. 16, 2014), http://
jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20141016/lead/lead33.html.
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violence, such as beatings, that may occur during marriage.157 Some Carib-
bean scholars have contended that Barbados’ sexual offences statute reflects
many of the common law exceptions to the spousal rape exemption that
developed overtime in Britain via case law.158 Thus, rather than being pro-
gressive on women’s issues by criminalizing spousal rape where the Standard
Spousal Rape Conditions have been satisfied, Caribbean countries such as
Barbados have simply codified the common law spousal rape exemption.
The sexual offences statutes of some Commonwealth Countries also
permit marriage to be used as a defense to statutory rape prosecution. For
instance, the Sexual Offences Act of Barbados provides that when a defen-
dant has sexual intercourse with a victim under the age of fourteen who is
not the defendant’s spouse, the defendant will be guilty of rape irrespective
of knowledge of age or consent.159 Under the common law, marriage con-
verted rape into consensual sex.160 From a postcolonial perspective, by al-
lowing marriage to serve as a defense to statutory rape, Commonwealth
Countries such as Barbados continue the common law tradition of retroac-
tively transforming rape into consensual sex. Such statutes perpetuate the
implied consent theory by implying that an underage girl’s irrevocable con-
sent to sex will be valid within the context of marriage. In contrast, the
consent given by an underage girl to sex outside of marriage is invalid.
The historical justifications for the spousal rape exemption limit the
sexual autonomy of Caribbean women and facilitate a husband’s power to
control and govern his wife. Under the unities theory, a husband could not
be found guilty of raping his wife; to do so would be to find the husband
guilty of raping himself.161 Spousal rape was a petty conflict between
spouses that the husband was entitled to win under the law.162 A number of
Commonwealth Countries use the term “sexual assault” rather than “rape”
to categorize spousal rape. For instance, both the Sexual Offences Act of
Antigua and Barbuda (“Antiguan Act”) and the Bahamian Act refer to
spousal rape as “sexual assault by a spouse.”163 In fact, both statutes specifi-
157. Sandra L. Ryder & Sheryl A. Kuzmenka, Legal Rape: The Marital Rape Exemption,
24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 393, 404 (1991).
158. Tracy S. Robinson, Changing Conceptions of Violence: The Impact of Domestic Violence
Legislation In the Caribbean, 9 CARIBBEAN L. REV. 113, 126 (1999).
159. Sexual Offences and Domestic Violence Act, art. 4 (2002) (Barb.).
160. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 804 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 2d ed.
2007).
161. See supra Part II(c).
162. See supra Part II(c).
163. Sexual Offences & Domestic Violence Act, art. 3(1); 15 (2010) (Bah.); Sexual Of-
fences Act 1995 (Act 9/1995), art. 3; 4 (Ant. & Bar.). In contrast, the Jamaican
statute uses the term “rape” to refer to spousal rape rather than the term sexual
assault. Sexual Offences Act 2009 (Act 12/2009), art. 5 (Jam.). More specifically, the
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cally provide that a spouse cannot commit the act of rape, reserving the
term “rape” for attacks by perpetrators who are not married to their vic-
tims.164 Similarly, rather than characterizing spousal rape as “rape,” the
CARICOM Model Law defines spousal rape as an “unlawful sexual connec-
tion.”165 The nomenclature of these statutes preserves the artificial distinc-
tion between spousal rape and stranger rape historically established by
British common law and rationalized by the unities and implied consent
theories. The express exclusion of spousal rape from the term “rape” indi-
cates that spousal rape is not viewed as “legitimate” rape, or is simply a less
serious crime than stranger rape, a concept deeply embedded in the com-
mon law tradition.
The retention of the unities theory is also reflected in statements by
Caribbean citizens. For instance, in response to efforts to criminalize spousal
rape, one citizen stated “it is ridiculous for them to try to make that a law,
because I don’t think a man can rape his own wife. After two people get
married. . . they become one – one flesh. How is it possible to rape what is
yours?”166
Under the common law, spousal rape has historically been viewed as a
mere “disagreement over sex;”167 accordingly, perpetrators of spousal rape
were exempted from prosecution, in contrast to the perpetrators of stranger
rape. The laws of certain Commonwealth Countries continue to perpetuate
these colonial views by providing lesser sentences for the perpetrators of
spousal rape. The Antiguan Act provides that the most severe punishment a
husband can receive if he is convicted of sexually assaulting his wife is fif-
teen years’ imprisonment,168 which is in stark contrast to the severe life
imprisonment punishment that a man may receive if he is found guilty of
raping a woman who is not his wife.169 Similarly, a person that is convicted
of stranger rape under the CARICOM Model Law may face life imprison-
act provides “A husband commits the offence of rape against his wife if he has sexual
intercourse with his wife in any of the circumstances specified in subsection (3)(a)
without her consent; and (b) knowing that she does not consent to sexual intercourse
or recklessly not caring whether she consents or not.” Id.
164. The Bahamian statute provides “rape is the act of any person not under fourteen
years of age having sexual intercourse with another person who is not his spouse . . .”
Sexual Offences & Domestic Violence Act, art. 3 (2010) (Bah.). The Antiguan stat-
ute provides that a “male person commits the offence of rape when he has sexual
intercourse with a female person who is not his wife . . .” Sexual Offences Act 1995
(Act 9/1995), art. 3(1) (Ant. & Bar.).
165. CARICOM Model Legislation, supra note 137.
166. See Cara Kulwicki, supra note 155, at 1.
167. DAVID FINKELHOR & KERSTI YLLÖ, LICENSE TO RAPE: SEXUAL ABUSE OF WIVES
14 (1985).
168. Sexual Offences Act 1995 (Act 9/1995), § 4(2) (Ant. & Bar.).
169. Id. at § 3(2).
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ment, while a person convicted of spousal rape will face a maximum of
fourteen years in prison.170 The Sexual Offences Act of Dominica provides
for a sentence of fourteen years for spousal rape and twenty-five years for
stranger rape.171
The different classifications and treatment accorded to stranger rape
and spousal rape under these laws create an irrational distinction between
victims of spousal rape and victims of stranger rape. The lesser sentencing
available for spousal rape in Commonwealth Countries illustrates the extent
to which common law justifications for the spousal rape exemption con-
tinue to be ingrained in the legal system of Commonwealth Countries.
D. Retention of Property Justification
Under the common law, women were viewed as the property of their
husbands. Men could not rape their wives as a man could not rape his own
property. Women were to be submissive; a woman’s body and her sexual
autonomy belonged to her husband. During the colonial period, slave
women’s bodies were viewed as the property of slave owners.172 Slave owners
had unrestricted sexual access to these bodies; the rape of slave women was
not considered a legal offence.173 In the Caribbean, patriarchy, slavery, and,
in particular, slave ship rape “bred violent conditions that established rape
[of the female body] as a culture within a culture.”174 After independence,
Caribbean men “[quested] for monopolistic control, ownership and posses-
sion of all properties” including the bodies of women, in order to solidify
their ability to rule.175 Hence, even after the colonial period, the treatment
of women as property and the expectation that wives must submit to their
170. CARICOM Model Legislation, supra note 137, at arts. 3(2), 4(3).
171. Sexual Offences Act 1998, art. 3 (Dom.). A few Commonwealth Countries, such as
Jamaica and Barbados, provide for equal sentencing for both spousal rape and stran-
ger rape. E.g., Sexual Offences and Domestic Violence Act, art. 3 (2002) (Barb.)
(providing for a sentence of life imprisonment for both stranger rape and spousal
rape); Sexual Offences Act 2009 (Act 12/2009), art. 6(1) (Jam.) (providing that de-
fendants convicted of spousal rape or stranger rape may receive a sentence of life
imprisonment, but must be given a sentence of not less than fifteen years in prison).
172. HILARY MCD BECKLES, CENTERING WOMAN: GENDER DISCOURSES IN CARIBBEAN
SLAVE SOCIETY 22 (1999).
173. Id. at 23. The lack of criminalization of the rape of black women by both masters
and non-masters during the era of slavery has been well documented in non-Car-
ribean countries, such as the United States. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essential-
ism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 599 (1990).
174. Joseph C. Lewis, “It Hurt Very Much at the Time”: Patriarchy, Rape Culture, and the
Slave Body-Semiotic, in THE CULTURE OF GENDER AND SEXUALITY IN THE CARIB-
BEAN 294, 296 (Linden Lewis ed., 2003).
175. Hilary McD Beckles, Black Masculinity in Caribbean Slavery, in INTERROGATING
CARIBBEAN MASCULINITIES 228 (Rhoda Reddock ed., 2004).
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husbands sexually continues to exist. Modern Caribbean views on spousal
rape indicate that the property theory may be inextricably linked with the
unities theory. For example, in response to debates on spousal rape one
citizen stated, “I disagree with the bill [criminalizing spousal rape] because I
disagree that a man can rape his wife. . . [because a]. . . wife’s. . . body
[becomes] his [body]. How could he rape her?”176
From a postcolonial perspective, the sexual offences statutes of Com-
monwealth Countries continue to perpetuate these views. Husbands may
rape their property as long as a judicial order or separation agreement is not
in place at the time of the rape. This reinforces the common law view that
wives and their sexual autonomy become the property of men upon mar-
riage and that a husband is free to continue to do with his property as he so
pleases until steps are taken to dissolve the marriage. Only upon the initia-
tion of the marriage dissolution process does a woman regain control over
her body and sexual autonomy.177
Since women were viewed as the property of either their husbands or
fathers under the common law, women were deemed to be under the pro-
tection of their fathers and then their husbands upon marriage. Married
women were not considered to be in need of additional protections under
the law.178 The sexual offences statutes of Commonwealth Countries retain
this irrational distinction between women who are worthy or in need of
protection under the law and women who are not. Under these statutes,
married women only become worthy of additional protections under the
law when steps are taken to remove a woman from her husband’s protection
by dissolving the marriage. Additionally, these statutes adopt a “blame the
victim” approach often seen in stranger rape cases. In the stranger rape sce-
nario, women who wear provocative clothing are frequently blamed for be-
176. Josh Witten, Silence: Marital Rape - East Meets West, SCIENCE 2.0 (Aug. 19, 20109,
12:05 PM), http://www.science20.com/rugbyologist/silence_marital_rape_east_
meets_west (citing Nikia Deveaux, Men, Women Divided Over Sex Bill, BAH. J., Aug.
6, 2009).
177. Similar views of women’s bodies as the property of their husbands and a husband’s
ability to exert control over their wives’ bodies are found in other postcolonial British
states. For example, although the interest of a potential father in a future embryo is
different than the interest of a husband in asserting a right to commit rape, some
states in the U.S. have attempted to require spousal notice prior to an abortion. See
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 897 (1992) (strik-
ing down spousal notice laws as unconstitutional and noting that statutes of this type
reflect archaic views of a woman’s role in a marriage and would not only restrict a
woman’s bodily integrity, but also “enable[ ] a husband to wield an effective veto
over his wife’s decision concerning an abortion[ ]”).
178. Joan Brathwaite, Women and the Law: A Bibliographical Survey of Legal and Quasi-
Legal Materials with Special Reference to Commonwealth Caribbean Jurisdictions, 8
CARIBBEAN L. REV. 176 (June 1998).
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ing raped. In the spousal rape scenario, the wife was most likely at fault
because she failed to submissively perform her wifely duties. In addition, by
protecting only women who have initiated the marriage dissolution process,
Caribbean governments may be inadvertently signaling that married women
continue to have a duty to perform their wifely duties during marriage. By
requiring a woman to first obtain a judicial order, the sexual offences stat-
utes of Commonwealth Countries fail to adequately protect women who
have not sought judicial intervention prior to a sexual assault. A married
woman may not have the financial resources to obtain a court order, or her
husband may have intimidated her from doing so. Wives who are the vic-
tims of spousal rape may suffer from feelings of shame or may feel responsi-
ble for their husband’s actions and, as a result, may fail to report the
crime.179 Women might also tolerate harmful relationships because they “in-
ternalize social values that see female subordination as ‘natural’ . . . [and] are
under social pressure to accept dominant cultural mandates.”180
E. Evolution of Marital Privacy and Reconciliation Justifications
As discussed in Part II(E) of this Article, marital privacy was protected
in certain instances under the common law, and modern-day conceptions of
marital privacy and reconciliation have been used in common law jurisdic-
tions to justify the spousal rape exemption. One of the many stereotypes
regarding spousal rape is the idea that wives secretly wish to be overpowered
and dominated by their husbands, a scenario that theoretically might pro-
mote marital reconciliation.181 In Barbados, during the House of Assembly
debates on the adoption of the domestic violence statute, debate partici-
pants frequently expressed the view that the Barbadian government should
not be “going into people’s bedrooms.”182
Modern-day Commonwealth Caribbean family law emphasizes mari-
tal reconciliation prior to divorce.183 This emphasis on reconciliation and
the protection of marital privacy has, in some instances, taken precedence
over the right of women to be free from violence. For instance, a trial judge
in Jamaica declined a petition for divorce, despite evidence that the wife had
179. See ROBERTA CLARKE, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE CARIBBEAN: STATE
AND NON-STATE RESPONSES (1998).
180. Maria Nieves Rico, U.N. Economic Comm’n for Latin America & the Caribbean,
Gender-Based Violence: A Human Rights Issue (June 1997), http://www.cepal.org/
mujer/noticias/paginas/9/27409/genderbasedvioilence.pdf.
181. JULIE A. ALLISON & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, RAPE: THE MISUNDERSTOOD
CRIME 90 (1993).
182. See Robinson, supra note 158, at 120 (citation omitted).
183. Tracy S. Robinson, New Directions in Family Law Reform in the Caribbean, 10 CAR-
IBBEAN L. REV. 101, 104 (June 2000).
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suffered physical abuse at the hands of her husband, based on the rationale
that incidents of punching and kicking do not go beyond the normal wear
and tear expected during a marriage.184 Under the common law, husbands
had the legally protected right to impose corporal punishment on their
wives since public authorities would intrude on the sanctity of marriage
only where a wife alleged permanent injury. The statutes of Commonwealth
Countries uphold similar common law notions regarding the sanctity of
marriage, as Caribbean governments continue to protect a husband’s right
to sexual intercourse with his wife. These statutes will not intrude on mari-
tal privacy unless certain conditions have been satisfied. It is only when
spouses reach outside of the confines of their marriage to access the judicial
system by obtaining, for instance, a separation order or separation agree-
ment prior to the rape that Commonwealth Countries will attempt to in-
fringe on marital privacy.
The implied consent, property, unities, and marital privacy theories
reflect a patriarchal ideology in which a husband is entitled to engage in
sexual intercourse with his wife. Husbands who raped their wives were not
subject to prosecution under rape statutes, while husbands who raped
women who were not their wives could be subject to lengthy prison
sentences. Under the current laws of most Commonwealth Countries, per-
petrators of spousal rape often continue to escape prosecution because of the
imposition of the Standard Spousal Rape Conditions. The laws of Com-
monwealth Countries do not distinguish between a husband who murders
his wife and a husband who murders a woman who is not his spouse.185
Likewise, there should be no such distinction between husbands who rape
their wives and husbands who rape women who are not their wives.
IV. CARIBBEAN OPPOSITION TO HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS
The international community recognizes violence against women, in-
cluding spousal rape, as a fundamental violation of human rights.186
184. Robinson, supra note 158, at 113 (citing Llewelyn v. Llewelyn, (1978) 27 W.I.R.
188 (CA Jam.)). The Court of Appeal ultimately reversed the trial judge’s decision.
Id.
185. In Antigua and Barbuda, the law distinguishes amongst various forms of homicide;
there is murder, manslaughter, infanticide, and excusable homicide. Offences
Against the Person Act, ch. 300, pt. 1 (1873) (Ant. and Barb.). Similarly, the Baha-
mian penal code distinguishes homicide; there is manslaughter, murder, abortion,
and infanticide. Penal Code, ch. 84, Title xx (2008) (Bah.). St. Lucia distinguishes
between murder, capital murder, manslaughter, gross negligent homicide, aiding in
suicide, and negligent endangering of life. St. Lucia Criminal Code, ch. 2,
§§ 85–114 (2008).
186. CLARKE, supra note 179.
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CEDAW “is often described as an international bill of rights for women.”187
All of the Commonwealth Countries have ratified CEDAW, as has Trinidad
and Tobago.188 CEDAW imposes a general obligation on ratifying member
states “to accord women equality with men before the law,”189 and requires
ratifying states to eliminate discrimination and ensure equality between men
and women in marriage and the family in a timely fashion and in good
faith.190 General Recommendation 19 requires states to exercise due dili-
gence in combating gender-based violence under CEDAW, and asserts that
“states may be responsible for private acts if they fail to act with due dili-
gence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of
violence and for providing compensation.”191 The CEDAW Committee has
repeatedly voiced its concern about the inadequate criminalization of
spousal rape in various countries and has stated that the spousal rape exemp-
tion is discriminatory.192 In its concluding observations, the CEDAW Com-
187. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women:
Overview of the Convention, U.N. WOMEN, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/
cedaw/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2014).
188. Ratification Status: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publica-
tion/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-8.en.pdf (last visited Apr. 20,
2014) (showing Barbados ratified Oct. 16, 1980; Jamaica ratified Oct. 19, 1984;
Dominica ratified Sept. 15, 1980; Trinidad & Tobago ratified Jan. 12, 1990, Anti-
gua and Barbuda acceded Aug. 1, 1989; Bahamas acceded Oct. 1, 1993; and Saint
Lucia acceded Oct. 8, 1982).
189. CEDAW, supra note 11, at art. 15 ¶ 1.
190. Id. at art. 16.
191. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommen-
dation No. 19, 11th Sess., 1992, ¶ 9, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/
recommendations/recomm.htm [hereinafter Gen. Rec. No. 19]; see also, MARSHA A.
FREEMAN, CHRISTINE CHINKIN, & BEATE RUDOLF, THE UN CONVENTION ON
THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN: A COM-
MENTARY 466–67 (2012). The standard of due diligence appears to be very high as
the Committee has noted that even in countries such as Austria where there is a
comprehensive model designed to remedy domestic violence issues including legisla-
tion, criminal and civil law remedies, education, training, shelters, and counseling,
there was still a failure on the part of the state to exercise due diligence where the
authorities knew or should have known of the danger of violence. Id.; see also,
Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 39th Sess., July 23,
2007-Aug. 10, 2007, Comm’n No. 6/2005, ¶ 12.1.5, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/39/D/
5/2005 (Aug. 6, 2007); Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women, 39th Sess., July 23, 2007-Aug 10., 2007, Comm’n No. 6/2005, ¶ 12.1.4,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/39/D/6/2005 (Oct. 1, 2007).
192. See Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104,
U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 85th Plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104, art. 2(a)
(Dec. 20, 1993); see e.g., Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, 37th Sess., Jan. 15 2007-Feb. 2, 2007, 38th Sess., May 14, 2007-
June 1, 2007, 39th Sess., July 23, 2007-Aug. 10, 2007, 162 ¶ 129, 250 ¶ 121, U.N.
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mittee recommended that Jamaica amend its legislation to eliminate the
Standard Spousal Rape Conditions.193
The IAS Convention defines violence against women “as any act or
conduct, based on gender, which causes death or physical, sexual or psycho-
logical harm or suffering to women, whether in the public or the private
sphere.”194 The preamble affirms that “violence against women constitutes a
violation of their human rights and fundamental freedoms. . . .”195 All of
the Commonwealth Countries in the Caribbean are member states of the
Organization of American States.196 The IAS Convention is binding on the
countries that have ratified it.197 Every Commonwealth Country has ratified
the IAS Convention.198 With respect to state obligations under the IAS
Convention, the Inter-American Commission of Women has recommended
that states strengthen their legal response to spousal rape, and the Inter-
American Human Rights Commission has criticized Jamaica’s spousal rape
laws, as well as the government’s inadequate response to cultural practices
that facilitate discrimination and violence against women.199
Doc. A/62/38; GAOR, 62d Sess., Supp. No. 38 (Jan. 1, 2007) (voicing concern over
the inadequate criminalization of spousal rape in Syrian Arab Republic and Singa-
pore); Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
40th Sess., Jan. 14 2008-Feb. 1, 2008, 34 ¶ 185, U.N. Doc. A/63/38; GAOR, 63d
Sess., Supp. No. 38 (Aug. 12, 2008) (voicing concern over the inadequate criminal-
ization of spousal rape in Lebanon).
193. Comm. for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Com-
ments of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Ja-
maica, 36th Sess., Aug. 7, 2006-Aug. 25, 2006, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/JAM/
CO/6-7/R.1 (Aug. 25, 2006).
194. Convention of Belém do Pará, supra note 11, at art. 1.
195. Id.
196. Charter of the Organization of American States, Dec. 13, 1951, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119
U.N.T.S. 3. Some Commonwealth Countries have also accepted the American Con-
vention on Human Rights; however, recognition of the jurisdiction of the American
Court on Human Rights requires states to make a special declaration under Article
62 of the Convention. American Convention on Human Rights art. 62, Nov. 22,
1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
197. Organization of American States AG/RES.2803 (XLIII-O/13), Implementation of
the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of
Violence Against Women, “Convention of Belém do Pará”, 43d Sess., June 4-6
2013, U.N. Doc. OEA/Ser.P/XLIII-O.2, at 187–90 (Oct. 3, 2013); see also General
Information on the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and
Eradication of Violence against Women, DEPT. OF INT’L LAW, ORG. OF AMERICAN
STATES, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-61.html (last visited Oct. 6,
2011) [hereinafter Ratification Status of Convention of Belém do Pará].
198. Ratification Status of Convention of Belém do Pará, supra note 197.
199. Org. of American States, Inter-American Comm’n on Human Rights, Report on the
Situation in Jamaica, ¶¶ 221, 225, U.N. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.144 (Aug. 10, 2012);
see also Paz Castillo & Luciana Prado, Organization of American States, Inter-Ameri-
can Comm’n of Women, Technical Note, Violence Against Women in Latin America
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Despite ratifying treaties aimed at protecting women from sexual vio-
lence and the presence of constitutional provisions on human rights, Com-
monwealth Countries have chosen to codify the common law spousal rape
exemption. Therefore, they are not in compliance with their obligations
under the IAS Convention and CEDAW. The colonial justifications for the
spousal rape exemption continue to be embedded in the modern-day sexual
offences statutes of Commonwealth Countries, as discussed in Part III
above, and so the effects of British colonialism continue to have ongoing
relevance. The failure of Commonwealth Countries to effectively criminal-
ize spousal rape indicates that Commonwealth Countries are not seriously
attempting to comply with their obligations under CEDAW or protect the
fundamental human rights guaranteed by the IAS Convention and their
constitutions. One potential explanation for the gap between treaty ratifica-
tion and state compliance in postcolonial Caribbean states is opposition to
the top-down imposition of modern-day human rights norms by former
colonial powers. As discussed below, the 1990s Caribbean human rights
backlash supports this assertion.
The continued use of the British Privy Council post-independence
evidences the extent to which colonialism continues to influence the legal
systems of Commonwealth Countries. Historically, the British Privy Coun-
cil has been funded by Britain, and during the emancipation period, British
judges were viewed as being free from local Caribbean pressure as well as
competent and impartial in administering the law.200
In the 1990s, Commonwealth Countries were outraged by the British
Privy Council’s decision in Pratt v. Attorney General, which held that the
potential execution of two prisoners held on death row for more than five
years violated the cruel and inhumane punishment provisions of the Jamai-
can Constitution.201 The Pratt decision made it more difficult for all Com-
monwealth Countries to impose the death penalty, as the judicial systems of
(Nov. 2010), http://www.oas.org/en/mesecvi/docs/TechnicalNote-VAWinLAC-EN
.pdf. (2012); see also Organization of American States, Technical Note, Violence
Against Women in Latin America, http://www.oas.org/en/mesecvi/docs/TechnicalNote-
VAWinLAC-EN.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2014).
200. Helfer, supra note 15, at 1867.
201. Pratt v. Att’y Gen. for Jam., [1993] UKPC 37, [1994] 2 A.C. 1 (P.C.) (appeal taken
from Jam.). After Pratt, the Privy Council went further by judicially internalizing
human rights principles under the American Convention on Human Rights (an un-
incorporated treaty) by holding that, where a death row inmate exercises his right to
petition an international human rights body to which Jamaica is a party, due process
requires Jamaica suspend action until it considers the decision of the international
human rights body. Lewis v. Att’y Gen. of Jam., [2000] UKPC 35, [2001] 2 A.C.
50 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Jam.); see also Berry & Robinson, supra note 113, at
112. The Privy Council has subsequently held the death penalty violates constitu-
tional rights in Belize and St. Lucia. Reyes v. R, [2002] UKPC 11, [2002] 2 A.C.
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Commonwealth Countries were suffering from severe judicial backlog and
lack of appropriate funding.202 Pratt provides an example of the British
Privy Council’s attempt to promote judicial internalization of human rights
norms; however, Commonwealth Countries ultimately rejected this inter-
nalization. In Pratt, the British Privy Council noted that since Jamaica had
executed both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the Optional Protocol, the views of the United Nations Human Rights
Council on the imposition of the death penalty “should be afforded weight
and respect but were not of legally binding effect.”203 In addition to men-
tioning the death penalty decisions of other international tribunals, the
court also stated that the European Court of Human Rights would have
found the imposition of the death penalty after a five-year waiting period to
violate Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.204 Com-
monwealth Countries were not only incensed by the British Privy Council’s
decision, which essentially required Commonwealth Countries to execute
prisoners within five years of placing a prisoner on death row, but were also
opposed to what they viewed as Britain’s continuation of legal imperialism
in the Caribbean.205
Before these decisions, Commonwealth Countries had maintained the
common law rule of death by hanging, and due to high crime rates, many
Caribbean citizens supported capital punishment.206 The Commonwealth
Countries’ staunch support of the common law death penalty rule also illus-
trates the extent to which traditional British common law rules imposed
during the colonial period are deeply embedded within the legal and social
structures of Commonwealth Countries. Many of these countries believed
that Britain, as a former colonial power, sought to impose modern British
human rights norms on Commonwealth Countries via the Pratt decision,
by usurping the power of Commonwealth Caribbean legislators and the
self-sovereignty of Commonwealth Countries.207 Ultimately, the Pratt case
impacted the Caribbean countries in that capital defendants could commute
235 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Belize); R v. Hughes, [2002] UKPC 12, [2002] 2
A.C. 259 (P.C.) (appeal taken from St. Lucia).
202. See Helfer, supra note 15, at 1873–74.
203. Pratt, [1994] A.C. at 13.
204. Pratt, [1994] A.C. at 20.
205. Helfer, supra note 15, at 1867–72, 1888.
206. Leonard Birdsong, The Formation of the Caribbean Court of Justice: The Sunset of
British Colonial Rule in the Caribbean, 36 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 197, 203
(2004-2005).
207. See Helfer, supra note 15, at 1872.
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their death penalty sentences by using domestic and supranational appellate
review mechanisms.208
Immediately after the rendering of the British Privy Council decision,
reports indicated that Jamaica intended to modify its constitution to explic-
itly preserve the common law death penalty.209 Jamaica and Trinidad and
Tobago both denounced the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights First Optional Protocol, and Trinidad and Tobago also denounced
the American Convention on Human Rights.210 Barbados amended its con-
stitution to preserve the death penalty, and Bahamas reinstated flogging as a
punishment, which had not been in place since 1984.211 The Common-
wealth Caribbean opposition to human rights norms in the 1990s indicates
that, to some extent, Commonwealth Countries reject a top-down imposi-
tion and internalization of human rights norms by the British Privy Coun-
cil. These countries may see the imposition of these rights as attempts by
the international community, and Britain in particular, to infringe on the
self-sovereignty of Commonwealth Countries and to culturally recolonize
these countries.
Commonwealth Countries’ opposition to modern human rights
norms is not limited to the death penalty or spousal rape. These countries
have also been opposed to human rights regarding sexual orientation. Anti-
sodomy statutes inherited from Britain during the colonial period are still in
place, and homophobia is rampant. However, there are some areas in which
Commonwealth Countries have begun to socially internalize human rights
norms. For example, corporal punishment in schools was a common prac-
tice in British and Caribbean schools during the colonial period. Common-
wealth Countries have made steady efforts to decrease corporal punishment
in schools and at home. Issues regarding children may be less politically
divisive, so it may be easier to adopt and implement programs regarding the
rights of children in contrast to the rights of women.
The Commonwealth Countries’ response to Pratt is, perhaps, a com-
mon response by postcolonial countries to a top-down imposition of human
rights norms by former colonial powers. Postcolonial states may seek con-
208. Id. at 1879; see also Ezekiel Rediker, Note, Courts of Appeal and Colonialism in The
British Caribbean: A Case For The Caribbean Court of Justice, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L.
213 (2013) (contending that the British Privy Council imposed obstacles to the
imposition of the death penalty by striking down the death penalty as a mandatory
punishment for murder in Jamaica).
209. Birdsong, supra note 206, at 225.
210. Helfer, supra note 15, at 1833, 1881.
211. BARB. CONST., art. 15(3); Margaret A, Burnham, Indigenous Constitutionalism and
The Death Penalty: The Case of the Commonwealth Caribbean, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L.
582, 587 (2005) (citing Prince Pinder v. The Queen, [2003] 1 A.C. 620
(P.C.)(appeal taken from Bah.)).
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frontation with former colonial powers to “demonstrate independence of
colonial or neo-colonial powers and a determination to be recognized as a
participant in the international political arena.”212 For instance, representa-
tives of Uganda, a former British colony, believed that NATO’s involvement
in the 2011 Libyan crisis was a pretense for undermining the sovereignty of
African states.213 Thabo Mbeki, former head of the African Union, has ex-
pressed similar views regarding what many Africans view as Britain’s and the
United Nations’ attempts to culturally recolonize Africa by attacking the
self-sovereignty of African countries.214 The African Union has also opposed
the prosecution of African heads of state by the International Criminal
Court (ICC) for human rights violations, because the African Union be-
lieves that African leaders are being singled out for prosecution in a subver-
sive attack on African self-sovereignty.215 The African Union has recently
threatened to withdraw from the Rome Statute establishing the ICC.216 A
number of Muslim majority countries have abstained from the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, because many of these countries view treaties of western origin
as instruments of colonial enterprise.217
From a postcolonial perspective, colonial principles like the common
law death penalty rule and spousal rape exemption may be so ingrained in
the political, legal, and social structures of postcolonial states, that
postcolonial states view these principles as traditional national rules or val-
ues rather than colonial rules. Postcolonial states may then resist attempts by
212. TIYANJANA MALUWA, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN POST-COLONIAL AFRICA 100
(1999).
213. Ruhakana Rugunda, African Union Statement on the NATO Invasion of Libya: It’s
Time to End the Bombing and Find a Political Solution in Libya, COUNTERPUNCH
(June 22, 2011), http://www.counterpunch.org/rugunda06222011.html.
214. Thabo Mbeki, Chairman, Thabo Mbeki Foundation, Address at the AGM of the
Law Society of the Northern Provinces: International Law and the Future of Africa
(Nov. 5, 2011), http://www.thabombekifoundation.org.za/Pages/address-by-the-pa-
tron-of-the-tmf,-thabo-mbeki,-at-the-agm-of-the-law-society-of-the-northern-prov-
inces-sun-city,-november-5.aspx.
215. See Assembly of the African Union, Decision on the Report of the Commission on
the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, 11th Sess., June 30, 2008-July 1,
2008, Doc. Assembly/AU/14(XI), 5, Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.199(X), (2008) (not-
ing abuse of the principle of Universal Jurisdiction by non-African states against
African leaders); Press Statement, African Union, Peace & Sec. Council, 141st Meet-
ing, Doc. PSC/PR/BR(CXLI) (July 11, 2008) (expressing concern over the alleged
abuse of ICC indictments against African Leaders).
216. See Assembly of the African Union, Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the Inter-
national Criminal Court, Doc. Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1, (Oct. 12, 2013); see also
Draft Letter from the Africa Union to Mr. Sang Hyung Song, President, ICC (Jan.
29 2014).
217. See Sadiq Reza, Torture and Islamic Law, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 21, 37 (2007).
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former colonial powers to impose modern human rights norms that contra-
dict these “traditional national rules.” Postcolonial states may ratify treaties
or express support for emerging human rights norms in order to signal to
the international community that they are committed to enhancing human
rights, and they may intend to comply with their treaty obligations, but
they only do so to the extent that their international obligations do not
conflict with “traditional national values.” Alternatively, postcolonial leaders
may indicate support for emerging human rights with intent to protect
these norms as they incorrectly assume that that the populace has aban-
doned “traditional national rules” in favor of accepting modern-day views
regarding the human rights of women. Further, labeling such values as
“traditional” may simply be a political move used to defend values and iden-
tities that Caribbean men insist on preserving in order to impede changes to
colonial laws and structures that favor a masculine identity which were re-
tained after independence, rather than a true widespread belief that such
values are authentically “traditional.” Trinidad and Tobago’s attempts in
1986 and 2000 to revise its sexual offences laws to eliminate the spousal
rape exemption illustrate these issues.
V. POSTCOLONIAL LEGAL REFORM IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
A. Trinidadian Sexual Offences Act
Trinidad’s first Sexual Offences Act, which was adopted in 1986
(“1986 Act”), represented the country’s initial attempt to address and recon-
solidate colonial rules that were established to regulate the sexuality of the
colonized.218 Many provisions of the 1986 Act were borrowed from British
statutes and common law.219 The initial draft of the 1986 Act criminalized
spousal rape and stranger rape equally. However, the version of the 1986
Act ultimately adopted by the legislature criminalized spousal rape only
where the Standard Spousal Rape Conditions were satisfied. In 2000, the
1986 Act was amended (“2000 Act”) to remove the Standard Spousal Rape
Conditions and to equally criminalize spousal rape and stranger rape.220
Trinidad’s initial failure in 1986 to eliminate the spousal rape exemption
and its successful legal reform fourteen years later, may provide lessons for
other Commonwealth Countries seeking to bring their laws into compli-
ance with their international obligations and constitutional provisions.
218. Alexander, supra note 86, at 8.
219. Id.
220. An Act to Amend the Sexual Offenses Act, 1986 § 4(1), No. 31-2010 (2000) (Trin.
& Tobago).
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Trinidad has often been lauded for its legislative efforts in the area of
women’s rights.221 Rhoda Reddock contends that the women’s movement
in Trinidad and Tobago has been instrumental in advocating for the adop-
tion of legislation beneficial to the human rights of women.222 The pan-
Africanist movement of the early twentieth century and the attainment of
universal suffrage in 1946 provided women with access to various opportu-
nities, including education and employment.223 This led to the creation of
organizations such as the National Commission on the Skills of Women,
Trinidad’s Women for Progress, and the Center for Gender Studies and
Development at the University of the West Indies.224
The experiences of the women’s movement in different Caribbean
countries is inextricably linked to issues related to economic develop-
ment.225 For example, the oil crisis of the 1970s severely affected Jamaica’s
economic prosperity.226 In contrast, the oil-producing country of Trinidad
and Tobago experienced an economic boom from 1973 to 1980.227 Moreo-
ver, the unique diversity of Trinidad and Tobago is also reflected in its
women’s movement.228 By the 1950s, Indo-Trinidad women were begin-
ning to challenge traditional gender roles, to the chagrin of Hindu and
Muslim religious authorities.229 The Hindu Women’s Organization has ac-
tively participated in integrating Hindu women into Trinidadian society.230
221. MINDIE LAZARUS-BLACK, EVERYDAY HARM: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, COURT RITES,
AND CULTURES OF RECONCILIATION 12 (2007).
222. RHONDA E. REDDOCK, WOMEN LABOUR & POLITICS IN TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: A
HISTORY 162 (1994).
223. See Rhoda E. Reddock, Diversity, Difference & Caribbean Feminism: The Challenge of
Anti-Racism, 1 CARIBBEAN REV. OF GENDER STUD. 1, 5–8 (Apr. 2007) (discussing
pan-Africanism and garveyism); REDDOCK, supra note 222 (discussing of universal
suffrage and educational opportunities).
224. REDDOCK, supra note 222.
225. Id. at 65.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See Michele Alexandre, Dance Halls, Masquerades, Body Protest and the Law: The
Female Body as a Redemptive Tool Against Trinidad’s Gender-Biased Laws, 13 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 177, 191 (2006). Indians accounted for 35.4% of the total
population, while Africans accounted for 34.2%. GOV’T OF TRIN. & TOBAGO,
MINISTRY OF PLANNING & SUSTAINABLE DEV., CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICe,
TRIN. & TOBAGO 2011 POPULATION AND HOUSING CENSUS DEMOGRAPHIC RE-
PORT (2012).
229. Eudine Barriteau, Theorizing Gender Systems and the Project of Modernity in the Twen-
tieth-Century Caribbean, 59 FEMINIST REV. 186, 202 (1998).
230. Rhonda Reddock, Women’s Organizations and Movements in the Commonwealth Car-
ibbean: The Response to Global Economic Crisis in the 1980s, 59 FEMINIST REV. 57,
63 (Summer 1998).
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In the 1980s, high levels of sexual violence against Trinidadian women
coupled with a growing feminist movement led to calls for legal reform.231
Greater access to jobs and educational opportunities increased women’s in-
dependence, meaning that “women were gaining more control over their
lives [while] men were losing some control over their own lives and over the
lives of women.”232 Prior to the adoption of the 1986 Act, women’s organi-
zations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) actively campaigned to
eliminate the spousal rape exemption, and a widely broadcast television se-
ries on women’s rights brought the issue of rape in Trinidad and Tobago to
the public’s attention.233 The women’s movement created alliances with
conservative women’s service provider organizations to advocate for legal
reform.
Although Trinidad and Tobago did not ratify CEDAW and the IAS
Convention until 1990 and 1996, respectively, the Law Reform Commis-
sion of Trinidad and Tobago, which was responsible for drafting the 1986
Act, was heavily influenced by legal reforms in the United Kingdom, Aus-
tralia, and Canada; these countries were viewed as being progressive on is-
sues related to gender equality and women’s sexual autonomy.234 The legal
reforms in these other jurisdictions reflected an international movement to-
ward the protection of emerging human rights norms on the role of women
in society.235 When attempting to revise their laws in 1986, Trinidad in-
tended to express to the international community its support and recogni-
tion of modern human rights norms. Trinidad’s attempts to eliminate the
spousal rape exemption in 1986 failed because of significant opposition
from male members of parliament, clergymen, and male lawyers.236 The
legislative history indicates that many members of parliament and the legal
minister at the time were opposed to what they viewed as the imposition of
contemporary gender norms that would displace Trinidadian values.237
From a postcolonial perspective, it appears that common law rules that re-
flected colonial values and justifications for women’s subordinated role in
marriage were so deeply rooted in Trinidadian society that they were viewed
as authentic traditional Trinidadian values. As a result, efforts to change
231. Yazmin Tambiah, Creating Immoral Citizens: Gender, Sexuality and Lawmaking in
Trinidad and Tobago, 1986, 3 CARIBBEAN REV. OF GENDER STUD. 1, 4 (2009).
232. Tina Johnson, The Impact of Women’s Consciousness on the History of the Present, 17
SOC. JUST. 126, 127 (Summer 1990).
233. PATRICIA ELLIS, WOMEN, GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN: RE-
FLECTIONS AND PROJECTIONS 135 (2003); see Johnson, supra note 232, at 127 (dis-
cussing television series on rape).
234. Tambiah, supra note 231, at 4–5; see supra note 188 and accompanying text.
235. Tambiah, supra note 231, at 5.
236. ELLIS, supra note 233.
237. Tambiah, supra note 231, at 5–8.
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these rules to bring them in conformity with emerging human rights norms
regarding the role of women in marriage were rejected.
The initial draft of the 1986 Act, which did not contain the Standard
Spousal Rape Conditions, reflected modern views on women’s autonomy
that were not necessarily shared by Trinidadian men at that time.238 The
following statement by the then Legal Ministers of Affairs supports this
assertion:
[W]hat has been paramount in our minds is the consideration of
our moral standards as obtained in our beloved Republic of Trin-
idad and Tobago. We hold firm to the view that what is good for
England . . . is not necessarily good for Trinidad and To-
bago . . . We feel we have to bring our laws relating to sexual
offences into the twentieth and twenty-first century. On the one
hand then, what works elsewhere, specifically in the advanced
capitalist, white-dominated states, is not necessarily acceptable at
home.239
A view of this statement through a postcolonial lens illuminates Trini-
dad and Tobago’s attempts to distance itself from modern human rights
recognized by former colonial powers that do not conform to traditional
Trinidadian values. Further, the explanatory note on the proposed 1986 Act
specifically stated that the act was not intended to interfere in the sexual
relationship between husbands and wives.240 Central to the public debate on
the 1986 Act was the historic justification of marital privacy discussed in
Part II(e) above. Many members of the Trinidadian parliament believed that
criminalizing spousal rape would intrude on marital privacy and interfere
with the sanctity of marriage.241 Thus, the Standard Spousal Rape Condi-
tions were ultimately included in the 1986 Act, and spousal rape was labeled
as “sexual assault” rather than rape since a consensus could not be reached
in parliament.242
Even after the 1986 campaign’s failure to eliminate the spousal rape
exemption, the women’s movement continued to organize around issues
related to women’s rights. While it did not result in the elimination of the
238. Johnson, supra note 232, at 130.
239. Tambiah, supra note 231, at 8 (citation omitted).
240. See Johnson, supra note 232, at 128.
241. Johnson, supra note 232, at 131.
242. S. 5th Parliament, 5th Sess., at 123, Dec. 7, 1999 (Trin. & Tobago) [hereinafter Sen.
Debate] (statement of Sen. Mohammed); H.R. 5th Parliament, 5th Sess., at 318,
335, May 4, 2000, 318, 335 (Trin. & Tobago) [hereinafter H.R. Meeting] (state-
ments of Hon. R. L. Maharaj & Hon. K. Persad-Bissessar).
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spousal rape exemption, the 1980s women’s movement led to the adoption
of the Domestic Violence Act. This act allowed women who suffered sexual
violence at the hands of their partners, including their husbands, to obtain
protective orders. By continuing to focus their campaigns on specific issues
and by partnering with women from traditional organizations, such as
women’s church groups, women in Trinidad conducted a successful cam-
paign for the adoption of various laws beneficial to women.243 With the
passage of the 2000 Act, Trinidad and Tobago became the first Common-
wealth Caribbean country to criminalize spousal rape and stranger rape
equally by removing the Standard Spousal Rape Conditions. The 2000 Act
explicitly provides that the provisions that apply to stranger rape also apply
in relation to a husband who commits the offence of rape on his wife.244
Spousal rape is no longer referred to as “sexual assault” but instead as rape
under the 2000 Act. Additionally, subject to a few exceptions, the 2000 Act
provides that a person who commits the offence of rape may be imprisoned
for life.245 Since spousal rape and stranger rape are treated similarly under
the 2000 Act, the maximum sentence of life imprisonment also applies to
defendants convicted of spousal rape. Although Trinidad and Tobago
equally criminalizes spousal rape and stranger rape, the 2000 Act contains a
defense of marriage for statutory rape similar to those found in the laws of
other Caribbean countries.246
The legislative history indicates that the 2000 Act was intended to
protect the sexual autonomy and sexual integrity of women, and it also
reflects partial political internalization of human rights norms.247 During
legislative debates on the 2000 Act, the Attorney General noted that the
1986 Act, which retained the Standard Spousal Rape Conditions, was
“archaic and outdated” as these conditions simply replicated the common
law spousal rape exemption. The Attorney General also noted that the
spousal rape exemption was completely eradicated in other common law
243. REDDOCK, supra note 222, at 62.
244. Sexual Offences Act, (Act 27/1986), § 4(5) (Trin. & Tobago).
245. Id. at § 4(2). The Trinidadian Sexual Offences Act provides that: a person who com-
mits the offence of rape is liable on conviction to imprisonment for life and any
other punishment which may be imposed by law, except that if—(a) the complain-
ant is under the age of twelve years; (b) the offence is committed by two or more
persons acting in concert or with the assistance or in the presence, of a third person;
(c) the offence is committed in particularly heinous circumstances; (d) the complain-
ant was pregnant at the time of the offence and the accused knew that the complain-
ant was pregnant; or (e) the accused has previously been convicted of the offence of
rape, he shall be liable to imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life. Id.
246. Id. at § 6.
247. Parliamentary Debates, 18 Off. Rep. 45 (Dec. 1, 1999) (Trin. & Tobago).
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jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom and Canada.248 Further, the At-
torney General explicitly acknowledged the colonial roots of the spousal
rape exemption by stating that the spousal rape exemption under the com-
mon law “is based on the fact that the husband has a proprietary right over
the wife and that she is a sexual object.”249
B. Lessons from Trinidad and Tobago
1. Failure to Change Cultural Values and Improper Implementation
Despite the relative legislative success in Trinidad and Tobago, the
laws that have been adopted to protect women’s rights are often ineffectively
implemented. During the senate debates regarding the adoption of the 2000
Act, Senator Nafeesa Mohammed acknowledged that although removing
spousal immunity was a step in the right direction, adopting new laws with-
out more would not lead to meaningful change, as demonstrated in the case
of the Domestic Violence Act, which has been inadequately imple-
mented.250 The effective implementation of “rights and protections requires
attention to everyday ideologies and practices of the culture at the
courthouse.”251
Rawwida Baksh and Linnette Vassell contend that colonial gender pol-
icy “defined a subordinate position for women vis-à-vis men in all aspects of
political, economic and socio–cultural life, and essentialized their identities
as wives and mothers under the authority of men within the private sphere.”
This policy continues to negatively affect the lives of Caribbean women.252
The parliamentary debates on the 2000 Act also illustrate the extent to
which the ideology of patriarchy and colonial identities regarding women’s
roles continue to be embedded within Trinidadian culture. On the issue of
248. Id. at 46–47.
249. H.R. Meeting, supra note 242, at 318 (statement of Hon. R. L. Maharaj).
250. Sen. Debate, supra note 242, at 115–16 (statement Sen. Mohammed). Sen. Moham-
med continued to note the tensions between societal goal of protecting sanctity of
marriage versus protecting the rights of individual family members. Id. at 118. Cul-
tural values and practices rooted in the ideology of patriarchy resulted in women
often failing to file for protective orders or women abandoning their initial attempts
to obtain protection orders and judges, police offers, probation officers, and court
staff serving as significant barriers to women obtaining protective orders. Id.; see also
Alexandre, supra note 228, at 192.
251. Mindie Lazarus-Black, The (Heterosexual) Regendering of a Modern State: Criminaliz-
ing and Implementing Domestic Violence Law in Trinidad, 28 L. & SOC. INQUIRY
979, 986 (2003).
252. Rawwida Baksh & Linnette Vassell, Women’s Citizenship in the Democracies of the
Americas: The English-Speaking Caribbean, INTER-AMERICAN COMM’N OF WOMEN
20 (Aug. 2013), http://www.oas.org/en/CIM/docs/CiudadaniaMujeresDemocracia-
Caribbean-EN.pdf.
2015] A  P O S T C O L O N I A L  T H E O R Y  O F  S P O U S A L  R A P E 139
removing the spousal rape exemption, Senator Cynthia Alfred stated, “the
man is the one who hunts or who pursues; the woman is the one, perhaps,
who lures. But, we also have women who tease. They tease the men and,
sometimes, after they make their mischief and the man reacts in a certain
way, the woman screams rape.”253 Senator Alfred continued by arguing that
if the Standard Spousal Rape Conditions were removed, vindictive wives
would use the new law to punish innocent husbands.254 Other members of
Trinidad’s legislative branch countered this point by arguing that the issue
of false crime reports is not limited solely to the context of spousal rape.
They added that husbands should not be allowed to use their wives as prop-
erty or to force their wives to turn over their bodies to them.255 The disso-
nant views of members of the legislature are reflective of broader societal
views on gender roles, and they indicate partial social and political internal-
ization of the norms under CEDAW and the IAS Convention. Despite the
2000 Act and the Domestic Violence Act, Trinidad and Tobago’s failure to
effectively address the gendered norms that are rooted in the ideology of
patriarchy has had negative consequences for the human rights of women.
These gendered norms may persist in Trinidad, not only because of the
retention of colonial norms and laws that contribute to the perpetuation of
these norms, but also because of the traditional cultural values of different
ethnic groups in Trinidad such as the Indo-Muslim and Indo-Hindu
population.
Mindie Lazarus Black argues that Trinidad’s culture of reconciliation,
which is based on traditional gender roles, places family stability before the
rights of individual family members.256 Further, she contends that the very
individuals charged with implementing statutes aimed at protecting women
from sexual violence may attempt to dissuade women from using these
laws.257 Black also notes that in Trinidad, family violence was historically
viewed as “husband and wife business,” and a husband’s ability to control
his wife was unquestioned.258 From a postcolonial perspective, these tradi-
tional views reflect the unities, privacy, and reconciliation theories that jus-
tify the spousal rape exemption under the common law.
Notwithstanding the adoption of progressive legislation on women’s
rights, such as the 2000 Act, Trinidadian women are still subject to high
levels of sexual violence. The U.N. Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean reported that Trinidadian gender polices should
253. Sen. Debate, supra note 242, at 145 (statement of Sen. Cynthia Alfred).
254. Id. at 146.
255. H.R. Meeting, supra note 242, at 318, 354 (statement of Hon. R.L. Maharaj).
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be revised.259 Country reports on human rights practices indicate that, de-
spite statutory provisions criminalizing spousal rape, courts often impose
much shorter sentences on convicted defendants than the punishment pre-
scribed by statute.260 Partly because of the insensitivity of the police, inci-
dents of rape and sexual violence are generally underreported.261 Further,
the police are often permissive in enforcing the law.262
As discussed in Part IV of this Article, CEDAW and the IAS Conven-
tion require ratifying states to adopt legislation and take concrete steps to
change cultural norms that perpetuate sexual violence and discrimination
against women. The 2000 Act successfully eliminated the ability of hus-
bands to freely sexually assault wives who have not satisfied the Standard
Spousal Rape Conditions. However, women continue to suffer from sexual
violence both in and outside the context of marriage. Trinidad’s experience
indicates that while an active women’s movement and NGOs are crucial to
the adoption of legislation protecting women’s rights, the legislation must
be effectively implemented in accordance with CEDAW and the IAS Con-
vention. Effective implementation requires, among other things, changes to
social and cultural norms and identities as well as the elimination of the
patriarchal ideologies that remain embedded within the political, legal, and
social structures of postcolonial states.
2. Failure to Incorporate International Treaties
Although CEDAW and the IAS Convention do not require direct in-
corporation, Trinidad and Tobago provides an example of incomplete legal
internalization of international norms, as these conventions have not been
fully incorporated on the domestic plane. Moreover, even though Trinidad
and Tobago and other Commonwealth Countries have ratified these trea-
ties, they continue to struggle to protect women from sexual violence. Thus,
it is unlikely that mere treaty ratification will sufficiently protect the human
rights of Caribbean women. These facts also indicate that the enforcement
mechanisms established under CEDAW and the IAS Convention may be
259. United Nations, Economic Comm’n for Latin America and the Caribbean, Carib-
bean Synthesis Review and Appraisal Report in the Context of the 15th Anniversary
of the Adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action 30 (May 10,
2010), http://www.eclac.org/mujer/noticias/paginas/0/39590/LCARL.259.pdf.
260. U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Country Re-
ports on Human Rights Practices for 2013: Trinidad and Tobago (Feb. 27, 2014), http:/
/www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index
.htm?year=2013&dlid=220475.
261. Id.
262. Id.
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inadequate.263 To fill the void between treaty ratification and vertical inter-
national enforcement of human rights norms, human rights scholars suggest
domestic enforcement of human rights.264
International law is enforced not only by states against other states but
also through domestic courts, political institutions, individuals, and other
interest groups that exert pressure on states to comply with their interna-
tional obligations.265 Individuals and interest groups, such as NGOs, may
also enforce international law by accessing domestic courts.266 Thus, the
incorporation of international law on the municipal level is central to do-
mestic enforcement of international law.
Trinidad and Tobago, like many other Commonwealth Countries, ad-
heres to the dualist doctrine under which international law is only enforcea-
263. The United Nations has acknowledged several challenges faced by its treaty bodies,
including the CEDAW Committee, such as the need for additional meeting time
and lack of human and financial resources. See G.A. Res. 68/268, ¶¶ 24–26, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/68/268 (Apr. 9, 2014). Following the conclusion of a two-year inter-
governmental process, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution
aimed at strengthening the enforcement mechanisms of the ten United Nations
treaty bodies. Id. The resolution has been criticized for its failure to adequately in-
crease the total amount of financial resources allocated to treaty bodies and its rec-
ommendation that treaty bodies bear in mind state views when working within their
mandates. Christine Broecker, The Reform of the United Nations’ Human Rights
Treaty Bodies, 18 AM. SOC. INT’L L. (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.asil.org/insights/
volume/18/issue/16/reform-united-nations-human-rights-treaty-bodies. The resolu-
tion also did not adequately address the lack of mechanisms in place to allow treaty
bodies to compel states to comply with their treaty obligations to submit reports and
implement treaty body recommendations.
264. See, e.g., Oona Hathaway, The New Empiricism in Human Rights: Insights and Impli-
cations, 98 AM. SOC’Y. INT’L. L. PROC. 208 (2004); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton &
Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty
Promises, 110 A.J.S 1373 (2005). It should be noted that some scholars believe focus-
ing exclusively on the concept of state compliance with international rules and
norms does not take into consideration the normative effectives of international law.
See Ruti Teitel & Robert Howse, Beyond Compliance: Rethinking Why International
Law Really Matters, 1 GLOBAL POL’Y 127, 130 (2010) (arguing the rules and norms
of international law may, among other things, “shift in whole or in part decision-
making, interpretative and/or legitimating power from one set of elite actors to an-
other” such as “from diplomats, foreign policy analysts and military planners to legal
professionals such as judges, lawyers and law professors.”).
265. Oona Hathaway, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Domestic Enforcement of International Law,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES 229 (John E. Noya et al. eds., 2007).
266. Id. Hathaway acknowledges domestic enforcement of international law is unlikely to
occur in autocratic states or states with corrupt judicial systems, but where there are
robust rule-of-law institutions, domestic enforcement of international law “can suc-
ceed even where there is stringent resistance by even the most powerful of political
actors.” Id.
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ble in the domestic sphere via incorporation of a treaty by statute.267 Under
a strict dualist approach, individuals cannot claim that a treaty is not being
performed or that individual rights granted under the treaty are being vio-
lated until the treaty has been incorporated into domestic law.268 Thus, do-
mestic courts will not apply or enforce the terms of an unincorporated
treaty, and to the extent that a treaty conflicts with domestic law, the terms
of the treaty will not be applied.269 Despite the state violations that may
accrue upon treaty ratification, treaty incorporation is necessary for the
principles and rights set forth in CEDAW and the IAS Convention to be
actionable in the domestic courts of Commonwealth Countries.270 Addi-
tionally, although a state becomes legally obligated to comply with the
terms of a treaty upon ratification, many treaties let states decide how that
compliance is to occur on the domestic plane.271 For instance, some treaties
simply obligate the state to adopt legislation to give effect to the terms of
the treaty.272
With respect to human rights treaties aimed at the protection of
women, such as CEDAW and the IAS Convention, Trinidad has failed to
directly incorporate these treaties into domestic legislation. Instead, Trini-
dad has incorporated some of the principles of CEDAW and the IAS Con-
vention in a piecemeal manner. For instance, arguably by eliminating the
spousal rape exemption in the 2000 Act and passing legislation on domestic
violence, Trinidad has adopted legislation to protect women from violence
and discrimination in certain areas as required by these conventions. While
acknowledging the passage of innovative legislation aimed at protecting the
rights of women, such as the 2000 Act, the CEDAW Committee has ex-
267. ANTOINE, supra note 103, at 217.
268. See Dinah L. Shelton, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC LEGAL:
INCORPORATION, TRANSFORMATION, AND PERSUASION 4 (Dinah L. Shelton ed.,
2011).
269. See Att’y Gen. v. Joseph, [2006] C.C.J. 3, ¶ 55 (A.J.), (2006) 69 WIR 104 (Barb.).
270. Shelton, supra note 268, at 4, 13, 308. Commonwealth Countries, like other com-
mon law countries, appear to adopt a monist approach with respect to customary
international law. Id. On the domestic plane customary international law becomes
part of domestic Caribbean law only to the extent that the customary international
law is not inconsistent with Acts of Parliament or a prior judicial decision of final
authority. Berry & Robinson, supra note 113, at 106. The constitutions of common-
wealth Caribbean countries are silent on the issue of treaty making and thus com-
mon law principles, which do not require legislative consultation before treaty
ratification, are controlling. Winston Anderson, Treaty Making in Caribbean Law
and Practice: The Question of Parliamentary Participation, 8 CARIBBEAN L. REV. 75,
75–77 (June 1998).
271. Id. at 3.
272. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, ¶ 2, Mar. 23, 1976, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
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pressed concern that certain provisions of CEDAW have not yet been di-
rectly incorporated into domestic legislation.273 The committee further
acknowledged that sexual violence against women in Trinidad is rooted in
traditional patriarchal attitudes that Trinidadian society has accepted.274 The
structures and norms inherited from colonialism have influenced the crea-
tion of gender systems in postcolonial Caribbean states that perpetuate ine-
qualities for modern-day Caribbean women.275 The marital privacy and
property theories used to justify the spousal rape exemption exemplify many
of these social norms inherited by postcolonial Caribbean states: for in-
stance, the belief that
[A]n individual and citizen is a male household head, the separa-
tion of society into private and public sphere, the world of the
dependence, the family and the world of freedom, the state and
work and the gendering of that differentiation so that women
are posed in opposition to civil society, to civilization.276
In contrast to its approach taken with respect to CEDAW, Trinidad
has taken steps to directly incorporate the provisions of various international
conventions aimed at protecting the human rights of children. For instance,
the 2008 Trinidad’s International Child Abduction Act specifically incorpo-
rates the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
by stating that the Convention “is to have the force of law in Trinidad and
Tobago.”277 Similarly, the Convention on the Rights of the Child has been
incorporated on the municipal plane through the adoption of the 2012
Children’s Act.278
Trinidad’s decision to directly incorporate the treaty provisions on
children’s rights, in light of its failure to do the same for treaty provisions
regarding women’s rights, perhaps signals to the Trinidadian populace that
the government does not place high importance on protecting women’s
rights or on complying with international rules aimed at protecting women.
This signal may contribute to the perpetuation of traditional patriarchal
views of women within society. Police officers, lawyers, judges, and courts
then, have little incentive to effectively implement domestic legislation, such
273. Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 26th
Sess., Jan. 14 2002-Feb. 1, 2002, ¶ 139, U.N. Doc. A/57/38 (pt. 1); GAOR, 57th
Sess., Supp. No. 38 (May 7, 2002).
274. Id. at ¶ 145.
275. Barriteau, supra note 229, at 187.
276. Id. at 194.
277. International Child Abduction Act 2008 (Act No. 8/2008), ¶ 4 (Trin. & Tobago).
278. Children Act 2012 (Act 12/2012) (Trin. & Tobago).
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as the Domestic Violence Act and the 2000 Act, which were adopted to
protect women from sexual violence. Trinidad and Tobago is not alone in its
failure to incorporate treaty provisions related to women’s rights. In fact,
many Commonwealth Countries have failed to directly incorporate
CEDAW and the IAS Convention by domestic legislation.279
Even where domestic legislation is changed without the domestic in-
corporation of treaty provisions, as was the case with Trinidad’s Domestic
Violence Act and the 2000 Act, new legislation may not effectively protect
the rights of women when a country nonetheless fails to address cultural
norms that negate the impact of such legislation. Further, women’s rights
are unlikely to be effectively protected when a country inadvertently signals
that it accords lesser weight to the human rights of women, by failing to
give direct domestic effect to international treaties aimed at protecting
women, while simultaneously giving direct effect to treaties that protect the
rights of others.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
This section posits that legal, legislative, social, and judicial internal-
ization of the human rights norms reflected in CEDAW and the IAS Con-
vention may contribute to changing power dynamics that perpetuate
inequality and negative identities for women. While these solutions are not
new, this Article uses postcolonial theory to assess which solution may be
more viable, as well as to determine the best way to implement internaliza-
tion of human rights norms given the colonial heritage and politics of
postcolonial Commonwealth Countries. This Article suggests that
postcolonial theory can be used to, not only trace the colonial foundations
of postcolonial law and provide insights regarding the modern day implica-
tions of colonialism, but also to assess what should be done with this
knowledge.
While postcolonial states may not be able to escape their colonial heri-
tage (as these states automatically became ‘postcolonial’ when colonialism
ended), the raison d’etre of postcolonial states is not to cease to be
‘postcolonial’ but to effectively exercise postcolonial agency by accepting
those aspects of their colonial heritage that are beneficial to their social,
political, and legal structures while rejecting those aspects that perpetuate
inequalities and negative identities, such as the common law spousal rape
exemption. Thus, some of the recommendations proposed below incorpo-
rate aspects of the colonial heritage of Commonwealth Countries, such as
279. See Winston Anderson, The Role of the Caribbean Court of Justice in Human Rights
Adjudication: International Treaty Law Dimensions, 21 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1,
12–13 (2011-2012).
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the use of British Privy Council case law to promote judicial internalization
of human rights norms by Caribbean judges. In contrast, other solutions
such as recommending that CARICOM modify its model law and en-
courage countries to address power dynamics and identities that negate the
human rights of women, rely less on the colonial heritage of Common-
wealth Countries, since CARICOM was established by Caribbean countries
after independence. Moreover legal, social, legislative, and judicial internal-
ization are undeniably intertwined.280 Judicial internalization of interna-
tional norms cannot occur without domestic litigation, and domestic
litigation often occurs where there is some preexisting level of social inter-
nalization of human rights norms, most likely by NGOs and a local
women’s rights movement. Similarly, social internalization of human rights
may foster legal and political internalization by pressuring the legislative
branch to amend existing legislation to protect human rights.
A. Legal, Social, and Legislative Internalization of Human Rights Norms
Judges, civil society groups, and international bodies, where appropri-
ate, should play a critical role in fostering internalization of human rights
norms. As part of the transnational legal process, effective legal internaliza-
tion of human rights norms by the legislative branch requires that the sexual
offences statutes be revised to completely eradicate the common law spousal
rape exemption, in addition to domestic incorporation of applicable human
rights instruments, such as the IAS Convention and CEDAW.281 Once trea-
ties such as the IAS Convention, which grant individual rights to women,
are incorporated on the domestic plane, Caribbean women will have the
ability to claim, in domestic courts, that their rights granted under such
treaties have been violated.282 Commonwealth Countries should also ratify
the CEDAW Optional Protocol, which would allow the CEDAW Commit-
tee to receive claims from Caribbean citizens for violations of rights under
280. Koh, supra note 13, at 2657.
281. A majority of states in the U.S. have enacted legislation expressly criminalizing mari-
tal rape. E.g., D.C. CODE § 22-3019 (Westlaw through Jan. 5, 2015); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 750.520l (Westlaw through P.A. 2014, No. 556, 558–72, of the 2014 Reg.
Sess.); N.H. REV. STAT. § 632-A:5 (Westlaw through end of 2014 Reg. Sess.); N.J.
STAT. § 2C:14-5(b) (Westlaw through laws effective through L. 2014, c. 90 & J.R.
No. 6); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-409 (Westlaw through Second Reg. Sess. of the
69th Gen. Ass. (2014) and amendments adopted through Nov. 4, 2014 Gen. Elect.).
282. Convention of Belém do Pará, supra note 11, at ch. II.
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CEDAW, request interim measures from states, conduct inquiries into grave
violations of women’s rights, and issue non-binding recommendations.283
Where the legislative branch fails to engage in legal internalization,
local civil society groups should actively invoke the provisions of CEDAW
and the IAS Convention in domestic litigation, as well as play an instru-
mental role in promoting internalization through domestic lobbying.
Postcolonial theory can be used to actively encourage and “engage in
the formation of positive new political identities.”284 Notwithstanding the
need for legislative and legal internalization, Trinidad and Tobago’s experi-
ence indicates that even when statutes are revised to equally criminalize
spousal rape and stranger rape, cultural attitudes and lack of effective imple-
mentation may foster environments in which the human rights of women
are inadequately protected. Thus, complete rather than partial social inter-
nalization of the norms reflected in CEDAW and the IAS Convention is
necessary. Social internalization is particularly important given the fact that
in some instances the legislative branch may fail to timely amend statutes to
reflect judicial decisions. After the New York Court of Appeals struck down
the spousal rape exemption in People v. Liberta in 1984, it took New York
legislators several years to amend the applicable statute to remove the
spousal rape exemption.285 Civil society groups also play an important role
in facilitating this process.
CEDAW and the IAS Convention require Commonwealth Countries
not only to adopt appropriate legislation to give legal effect to the conven-
tions on the domestic plane but also to change cultural norms that diminish
the human rights of women.286 Commonwealth governments should en-
deavor to create a broader metanarrative of the role of women in society by
establishing opposing norms to counteract the restrictive norms and identi-
ties established by the common law. From a postcolonial perspective, the
sexual autonomy of women must be protected, and the gendered norms
that are vestiges of colonial rule and that underlie rape laws must be ad-
dressed. The leaders of Commonwealth Countries as well as the Caribbean
populace must ‘buy in’ to the elimination of gendered norms and identities
283. CEDAW Optional Protocol, supra note 17. See also, CEDAW Background Informa-
tion, available at http://owjn.org/owjn_2009/legal-information/international-law/281-
cedaw-background-information (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
284. Roy, supra note 19, at 320.
285. Cassandra M. DeLaMothe, Liberta Revisited: A Call to Repeal the Marital Exemption
for All Sex Offenses in New York’s Penal Law 23 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 857, 858
(1996).
286. CEDAW, supra note 11, at art. 5; Convention of Belém do Pará, supra note 11, at
art. 8.
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that foster the subjugation of women and continue to be used as a justifica-
tion for the spousal rape exemption.
Elimination of the spousal rape exemption must be done in such a
manner that Commonwealth Countries do not view it as another attempt
by former colonial powers to impose modern-day British views on the
human rights of women. The provisions of CEDAW require Common-
wealth Countries to eliminate stereotypes and social and cultural practices
based on the inferiority of women.287 The leaders of Commonwealth Coun-
tries and the Caribbean populace must begin to view international human
rights norms as domestic norms and domestic law. Direct domestic incor-
poration of human rights treaties by Commonwealth Countries may facili-
tate this process. Common law judges in the United States, New Zealand,
Canada, and Australia have successfully used various interpretative tech-
niques to incorporate treaties into domestic law.288 Further, legal internal-
ization by the legislative branch as well as social internalization of human
rights norms can foster judicial internalization. Domestic incorporation of
CEDAW and the IAS Convention, along with efforts by local interests
groups and changes in cultural practices and norms regarding the role of
women, may require Caribbean judges to view these treaties not only as a
persuasive source of constitutional interpretation, but ultimately as a bind-
ing normative framework for striking down incompatible domestic
legislation.
B. Judicial Internalization of Human Rights Norms
Ruti Teitel posits that international law continues to play an increas-
ing role in domestic courts.289 Even in states such as Belgium, where there
has been direct incorporation of CEDAW on the domestic plane, CEDAW
has rarely been invoked in domestic courts.290 As a result, the CEDAW
Committee has encouraged states to promote greater awareness of the provi-
sions of CEDAW and to ensure that judges interpret CEDAW in a manner
that is consistent with state obligations under CEDAW.291 Despite the lack
of use of CEDAW in the courts of some countries, the provisions of
CEDAW have been successfully used in domestic litigation in Asia Pacific
287. CEDAW, supra note 11, at art. 5(a).
288. See Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive Incor-
poration of Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 657–58 (2007).
289. RUTI TEITEL, HUMANITY’S LAW 186–92 (2011).
290. See Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding Ob-
servations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women:
Belgium, 42d Sess., Oct. 20, 2008-Nov. 7, 2008, ¶¶ 17–18 U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/
BEL/CO/6 (2008); FREEMAN, supra note 191, at 81.
291. FREEMAN, supra note 191, at 81.
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countries to challenge discriminatory laws and cultural practices. Judges in
this area have taken an active role in ensuring the protection of human
rights reflected in CEDAW.292
This Article seeks not only to trace the colonial foundations of the
spousal rape exemption, but also to assess the role that colonialism contin-
ues to play in the willingness of postcolonial states to adhere to international
norms, as well as judicial decisions respecting these norms. As discussed in
Part IV of this Article, judicial decisions by the British Privy Council that
rely on international human rights norms to invalidate Caribbean proce-
dures have not been well received by the Caribbean populace. Further, the
legislative history of the 1986 Act in Trinidad and Tobago indicates that in
some postcolonial states, modern-day human rights norms recognized by
Britain may not be viewed as appropriate for postcolonial society.
Sociologists have frequently commented on the role of law in creating
and reflecting social norms. Under Émile Durkheim’s theory of solidarity,
laws emanate from a shared system of values that exist in society and laws
can change in response to societal needs.293 The Caribbean opposition to
British Privy Council decisions and “British norms” may be due in part to
the fact that the British Privy Council is viewed as a relic of colonial times,
and the Caribbean populace does not view the British Privy Council or
Britain as having or reflecting a shared system of values with the Caribbean.
Internalization of international norms, if done correctly, may be able to
bridge the gap between Caribbean values and international values. The suc-
cessful Trinidadian reform in 2000 indicates that a bottom-up approach to
the internalization of human rights norms may eventually lead to successful
statutory reform. However, statutory reform is only the first step towards
achieving equality for women as negative cultural practices and stereotypes,
among other things, must also be changed.
Judicial decisions that invalidate domestic laws on human rights
grounds and give domestic effect to unincorporated treaties may be better
received if Caribbean judges, rather than the British Privy Council, render
these decisions. For instance, after the Pratt decision, Barbados attempted to
292. See Vedna Jivan & Christine Foster, What Would Gandhi Say? Reconciling Universal-
ism, Cultural Relativism and Feminism Through Women’s Use of CEDAW, 9 SING.
YEARBOOK OF INTERNAT’L L. 103, 104 (2005) (describing judicial activism in ap-
plying CEDAW in cases in India and the Philippines).
293. See ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOUR IN SOCIETY 24–28 (W.D. Halls
trans., 1984). In interpreting Durkheim’s work, sociologist Roger Cotterrell posits
that the value of mutual respect for the freedom and dignity of others is central to
modern day conceptions of legal rights and this value of mutual respect along with
moral imperatives promotes individual commitment to and respect for the rule of
law in modern societies. ROGER COTTERRELL, ÉMILE DURKHEIM: LAW IN A MORAL
DOMAIN (1999).
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preserve its ability to impose the death penalty by appealing Attorney Gen-
eral v. Boyce to the Caribbean Court of Justice (“CCJ”).294 This attempt
ultimately failed.
The CCJ was established in 2001 and became fully operational in
2005.295 All of the Commonwealth Countries executed the agreement es-
tablishing the CCJ, but to date, Barbados, Belize, and Guyana are the only
countries that have replaced the British Privy Council with the CCJ.296 The
CCJ was intended to create a regional Caribbean Supreme Court that ad-
dressed the unique needs of the Caribbean populace and fostered a distinct
Caribbean jurisprudence.297 In addition, the CCJ was created as a result of
the Caribbean opposition to the British Privy Council decisions that invali-
dated the mandatory death penalty rule on both human rights and constitu-
tional grounds.298 In Attorney General v. Boyce, the CCJ reasoned that “the
death penalty . . . should not be carried out without scrupulous care being
taken to ensure that there is procedural propriety and that in the process
fundamental human rights are not violated.”299 The court acknowledged
that Barbados had ratified, but had not incorporated, the American Con-
vention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. The court used the legitimate expectations doctrine to “to
294. Barbados to Challenge Pratt and Morgan Ruling at CCJ, JAM. OBSERVER, June, 19,
2006, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/107306_Barbados-to-challenge-Prattt-
and-Morgan-ruling-at-CCJ. The Boyce case was initially decided by the British Privy
Council, which upheld the mandatory death penalty in Barbados, reasoning that the
savings clause of the Barbados constitution provided that no existing law could be
held to be inconsistent with a person’s right to be free from inhuman or degrading
punishment. Boyce v. The Queen, [2004] UKPC 32 (appeal taken from Barb.). The
mandatory death penalty as existing law was therefore valid according to the court.
Id. Barbados had also adopted a constitutional amendment in 2002 to preserve the
death penalty. The defendants filed an application before the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights requesting a declaration that their rights under the Amer-
ican Convention on Human Rights were violated. Att’y Gen. v. Joseph, [2006]
C.C.J. 3, ¶ 7 (A.J.), (2006) 69 WIR 104 (Barb.).
295. Frequently Asked Questions, THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.carib-
beancourtofjustice.org/about-the-ccj/faqs (last visited Jan. 22, 2015).
296. Id.
297. See Birdsong, supra note 206, at 199–200. The CCJ stated that the decisions of the
Privy Council would serve only as persuasive authority; however, the CCJ also noted
that Privy Council decisions issued while the Privy Council was still the final court
of appeals for Barbados and that decided comparable statutory law in other Carib-
bean countries are still binding on Barbadian courts until such time as the CCJ
overrules those cases. Berry & Robinson, supra note 113, at 28.
298. Birdsong, supra note 206, at 203–04 (arguing that, although the CCJ was formed
after Pratt, discussions over creation of the CCJ occurred at least one year before
Pratt).
299. See Joseph, [2006] C.C.J. at ¶ 20; see also Anderson, supra note 270. (general discus-
sion of the human rights decisions of the CCJ).
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finesse the rule that unincorporated treaties have no effect in domestic
law.”300 The CCJ found that although unincorporated treaties may not be
enforceable on the municipal plane, citizens have a legitimate expectation to
the rights established by treaties that have been ratified by a country yet
remain unincorporated.301 The court ultimately dismissed Barbados’ appeal
of the commutation of the death penalty sentences and acknowledged that
in principle, its holding upheld the decision of the British Privy Council in
Pratt.302
In response to the CCJ’s decision in Boyce, the government announced
plans to eliminate the mandatory death penalty in Barbados.303 Trinidad
and Tobago also tabled its efforts to pass a constitutional amendment to
preserve the death penalty.304 A 2011 study of the death penalty in Trinidad
and Tobago indicated that “three-quarters of those interviewed did not sup-
port the mandatory death penalty.”305 The CCJ justices’ use of the legiti-
mate expectations doctrine reflects judicial internalization of human rights
300. Joseph, [2006] C.C.J. at ¶¶ 51–78. One of the main issues on appeal was whether
the government could execute the defendants before conclusion of the Inter-Ameri-
can human rights process. Id. The court held that treaty-compliant behavior by Bar-
bados had created a legitimate expectation that Barbados would await a decision by
the Inter-American human rights system before imposing the death penalty. Id. Ulti-
mately, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights made the requested dec-
larations, and the American Court on Human Rights issued provisional measures
requiring Barbados to not execute the two defendants. Id. at ¶ 5–6.
301. Joseph, [2006] C.C.J. at ¶¶ 5–6; see also ANTOINE, supra note 103, at 225. It should
be noted that although the CCJ critiqued the Privy Council’s departure from the
dualist approach in prior death penalty cases, the CCJ also declined to adopt a strict
dualist approach. Joseph, [2006] C.C.J. at ¶ 51. In Commonwealth Countries inter-
national law is not included in the definition of “law.” Berry & Robinson, supra note
113, at 119. Thus, it is unlikely that an individual may have a legitimate expectation
about a process that forms no part of the municipal legal system. Id. Legitimate
expectations must at least arise out of processes that are recognized by municipal law.
Id. at 120. In Joseph, Justice Wit critiqued the use of radical dualism in Common-
wealth Countries and argued that “maintaining an old and unsound doctrine that
stimulates an approach whereby treaties are ratified but almost never enacted, causes
States to be perceived as having a split personality.” Joseph, [2006] C.C.J. at ¶ 46.
Justice Wit contends that in Commonwealth Caribbean countries unincorporated
treaties may establish rights under domestic law. Berry & Robinson, supra note 113,
at 119.
302. Joseph, [2006] C.C.J. at ¶ 138. The court also acknowledged that despite upholding
the principles of Pratt it did not support strict implementation of the five-year dead-
line imposed by Pratt. Id.
303. See Talks about the Death Penalty Plan, BARB. TODAY, Mar. 15, 2013, http://www
.barbadostoday.bb/2013/03/15/talks-about-the-death-penalty-ban/.
304. Peter Richard, Caribbean: Trinidad Pressured to Drop Mandatory Hanging, INTER-
PRESS SERVICE, Mar. 14, 2013, http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/03/trinidad-pres-
sured-to-drop-mandatory-hanging/.
305. Id.
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norms, as the justices attempted to promote confluence between domestic
law and international law. Similarly, in Myrie v. the State of Barbados, the
CCJ noted its obligation to “take into account principles of international
human rights law when seeking to shape and develop relevant [Caribbean]
law.”306 In contrast to the Caribbean response to the Pratt decision, none of
the Commonwealth Countries denounced or withdrew from any treaties as
a result of the CCJ’s decision in Boyce. Although the death penalty contin-
ues to remain a highly contested issue in the Caribbean, the judgment of
the CCJ in Boyce has certainly increased the pressure on Caribbean coun-
tries to eliminate the death penalty and comply with their human rights
obligations on this issue. Thus, even where decisions by Caribbean judges
internalize human rights norms in a manner that leads to results that are
similar to decisions rendered by the British Privy Council, these decisions by
Caribbean judges may be more likely to be viewed as reflecting a shared
system of values with the Caribbean populace and therefore may be better
received.
Other decisions by local Caribbean courts applying principles from
unincorporated treaties are generally limited to instances where domestic
legislation is absent or ambiguous on the applicable issue.307 The 1988 Ban-
galore Principles of Judicial Conduct support this approach; judges from
member states of the British Commonwealth Association, an intergovern-
mental organization consisting of fifty-three former British postcolonial
306. Myrie v. State of Barbados, [2013] CCJ 3, ¶ 7 (O.J.). In Myrie, the plaintiff alleged
Barbados violated her rights to non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality and
freedom of movement under the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (“RTC”) and a
2007 decision of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Com-
munity (“Conference Decision”) under the RTC when she was cavity searched at the
border. Id. at ¶¶ 3–4, 8. The plaintiff also sought a declaration from the CCJ that
Barbados had violated her rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights. Id. at ¶ 9. Although the CCJ acknowledged it did not have
jurisdiction to make the requested declarations because the treaties contained sepa-
rate dispute mechanisms, it was required to apply applicable rules of international
human rights law. Id. at ¶ 10. The court reasoned that domestic incorporation of
decisions rendered under the RTC was not necessary to give domestic effect to deci-
sions taken under the treaty, as requiring domestic incorporation would defeat the
purpose of the CARICOM regime. Id. at ¶¶ 51–53. The CCJ held that it is required
to adjudicate claims alleging a violation of the RTC even where there is a conflict
between the treaty and domestic law, and that CARICOM member states are obli-
gated to ensure  their domestic laws comply with the treaty and decisions adopted by
the organs of CARICOM under the treaty. Id. at ¶ 52. The court ultimately held
that Barbados violated the plaintiff’s right to travel freely without harassment in
CARICOM countries under the 2007 Conference Decision and RTC art. 45. Id. at
¶¶ 100–01.
307. See ANTOINE, supra note 103, at 218, 228; see also Anderson, supra note 279, at 11.
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states and Commonwealth Countries, adopted these principles after a series
of judicial colloquia.308 The laws of Commonwealth Countries are unam-
biguous on the issue of spousal rape, as most specifically provide that a
husband will receive immunity from spousal rape prosecution unless one of
the Standard Spousal Rape Conditions have been satisfied. Under the 1988
Bangalore Principles, it is highly unlikely that the domestic courts of Com-
monwealth Countries will apply unincorporated treaty principles that di-
rectly conflict with their sexual offences statutes to protect married women
who are raped by their husbands. However, the 1988 Bangalore Principles
were revised in 1998. The concluding statements of the 1998 colloquia in-
dicate that common law judges have a duty not only to apply international
law in instances where domestic law is unclear, but also to interpret consti-
tutions and domestic legislation in harmony with international treaties and
customary international law to protect human rights.309
From a postcolonial perspective, Caribbean judges and lawyers must
be instrumental in crafting a postcolonial identity for Caribbean states that
is committed to protecting the human rights of citizens. In those Common-
wealth Countries with weak civil society groups, or where the legislative
branch may lack the political will or the cohesiveness to directly incorporate
human rights treaties such as CEDAW and the IAS Convention, to ratify
the CEDAW Optional Protocol, or to revise domestic statutes to eliminate
gendered justifications inherited from colonial rule, Commonwealth Carib-
bean judges can play an important role by promoting harmony between
domestic law and human rights set forth in unincorporated treaties. Com-
monwealth Caribbean judges must be willing to use unincorporated treaties
as persuasive sources of constitutional interpretation, particularly in areas in
which constitutional provisions can be used to support the call for respect
for human rights. In Boyce, the CCJ explicitly noted that in assessing the
meaning of rights established by domestic law, domestic courts in the Car-
ibbean may consider and apply the jurisprudence of international bodies.310
308. See Developing Human Rights Jurisprudence: Domestic Application of International
Human Rights Norms, 1 COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, HUMAN RIGHTS UNIT xi
(1988).
309. See The Challenge of Bangalore: Making Human Rights a Practical Reality: Domestic
Application of International Human Rights Norms, 8 COMMONWEALTH SECRETA-
RIAT, HUMAN RIGHTS UNIT 267–70 (2001); see also Waters, supra note 288, at
646–48 (contending that the concluding statements from the 1998 Bangalore Collo-
quium indicate a shift toward monism in common law jurisdictions with judges
playing a more active role in incorporating international treaties into domestic law
through judicial interpretation).
310. Joseph, [2004] UKPC 32 at ¶ 25. The CCJ further noted that its decision is not
intended to support the wholesale domestic enforcement of unincorporated treaties.
Id. at ¶ 26.
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The following sections provide various examples of how the provisions
of CEDAW and the IAS Convention could be used by Caribbean judges to
inform constitutional provisions such as equal protection and the right to
security in order to invalidate the statutory spousal rape exemption.
C. Judicial Internalization of CEDAW
The constitutions of Commonwealth Countries provide either that
every individual has the right to equality under the law or that every indi-
vidual has the right to be free from discrimination.311 The constitutions of
St. Lucia, Dominica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Antigua and Barbuda pro-
vide that the right to equal protection under the law should be freely exer-
cised, irrespective of a person’s gender.312 The Commonwealth Countries’
constitutional equal protection provisions and their obligations to eliminate
sexual violence and discrimination against women under CEDAW and the
IAS Convention should provide concrete bases for judges to invalidate the
statutory spousal rape exemption. Courts in other jurisdictions have invali-
dated the spousal rape exemption on equal protection grounds.313 Similarly,
judges in other countries with a dualist tradition have used the provisions of
CEDAW to interpret constitutional provisions in favor of the protection of
the human rights of women.314 For instance, despite a lack of direct domes-
tic incorporation of CEDAW, the High Court of Malaysia used CEDAW’s
ban on pregnancy discrimination to interpret a constitutional prohibition
311. ANT. & BARB. CONST., art. 14; BAH. CONST., art. 26; BARB. CONST., art. 23;
DOMINICA CONST., art. 13(1); JAM. CONST., art. 24; ST. LUCIA CONST., art. 1;
TRIN. & TOBAGO CONST., art. 4(b).
312. ST. LUCIA CONST., art. 1; DOMINICA CONST., art. 13(1); TRIN. & TOBAGO
CONST., art. 4(b); ANT. & BARB. CONST., art. 14; BARB. CONST., art. 23. Although
the Constitutions of Jamaica, Bahamas, and Barbados prohibit discrimination, the
definition of discrimination does not include differential treatment based on gender
or sex.
313. E.g., People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152 (1984) (holding that the N.Y. statute codify-
ing the spousal rape exemption failed to pass rational basis scrutiny under the equal
protection clauses of both the U.S. and N.Y. constitutions). A number of other U.S.
state courts have held there is no rational basis for the spousal rape exemption. E.g.,
People v. De Stefano, 121 Misc. 2d 113 (1984) (New York); State v. Rider, 449 So.
2d 903 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 315 S.E.2d 847
(Va. 1984); Commonwealth v. Chretien, 417 N.E.2d 1203 (Mass. 1981); State v.
Smith, 426 A.2d 38 (N.J. 1981); State v. Smith, 401 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981). Cf. People v. Brown, 632 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1981) (holding that the
spousal rape exemption did meet rational basis scrutiny).
314. Jaclyn Ling-Chien Neo, Calibrating Interpretive Incorporation: Constitutional Interpre-
tation and Pregnancy Discrimination Under CEDAW, 35 HUM. RTS. Q. 910, 912
(2013).
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on gender discrimination to strike down employment practices that dis-
criminate against pregnant women.315
With respect to defining the concept of equal protection and anti-
discrimination in Caribbean constitutions, the British Privy Council in
Mohanlal Bhagwandeen v. Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago held that
“a claimant who alleges inequality of treatment or its synonym discrimina-
tion must ordinarily establish that he has been or would be treated differ-
ently from some other similarly circumstanced person or persons.”316
The spousal rape exemption, as preserved by the statutes of Common-
wealth Countries, establishes the following illogical distinctions that treat
similarly situated individuals differently: cohabitating married couples and
cohabitating nonmarried couples; married women who have filed for, but
have not yet obtained, a divorce and those who have not filed; married
couples who have obtained a separation agreement and those who have not;
married couples who have obtained a judicial decree that prevents a hus-
band from having intercourse with his wife and married couples who have
not; a married woman who is raped by her husband and a single woman
who is raped by that woman’s husband; a married man who rapes his wife
and a single man who rapes the same married woman; and married women
who have provided their husbands with notice of a filed petition for separa-
tion or divorce and those who have not.317
A married man who rapes his wife is no different than an unmarried
man who rapes a woman as both are rapists; however, under the laws of
Commonwealth Countries, spousal rapists and stranger rapists are treated
differently. For a spousal rapist to be prosecuted, not only must the victim
not consent to the sexual intercourse, but the Standard Spousal Rape Con-
ditions must also be satisfied.
Sexual autonomy has been defined as “the right to freely decide when,
with whom, and under what circumstance, to engage in sexual intercourse
or other intimate behaviors with another person.”318 The statutes of Com-
315. See Saikin v. Basirun, No. 21-248-2010 (July 12, 2011) (Malay.). In Saikin, the
plaintiff’s offer of employment was revoked after her employer learned of her preg-
nancy. Id. The court used articles 1 and 11 of CEDAW to find that revocation of the
employment offer constituted gender discrimination, which was prohibited by the
Malaysian Constitution. Id; see also Neo, supra note 314, at 912–13.
316. [2003] UKPC 21, ¶ 18 (appeal taken from Trin. & Tobago).
317. Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 42 U. FLA. L. REV. 45, 65 (1990) (making similar equal protection arguments
regarding the irrational distinctions established by the spousal rape exemption con-
tained in the laws of certain American states).
318. Chih-Chieh Lin, Failing to Achieve the Goal: A Feminist Perspective on Why Rape Law
Reform in Taiwan Has been Unsuccessful, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 163, 178
(2010).
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monwealth Countries fail to equally protect the sexual autonomy of
women. Under these statutes, a husband’s right to sexual autonomy, or the
right to freely decide to engage in intercourse, is adequately protected; how-
ever, a married woman’s right to sexual autonomy does not receive similar
protection if she fails to satisfy at least one of the Standard Spousal Rape
Conditions and the lack of consent conditions prior to being assaulted by
her husband.319 In contrast to the lack of protection given to a married
women’s sexual autonomy, an unmarried woman’s right to sexual auton-
omy under these statutes is protected to the extent that the intercourse oc-
curred without her consent.320
The CEDAW Committee has stated that any distinction, exclusion, or
restriction that has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the rec-
ognition, enjoyment, or exercise by women of human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms is discrimination, even where discrimination was not
intended.321 The CEDAW Committee has acknowledged, and CEDAW
provides, that women have the right to be free from discrimination, irre-
spective of their marital status.322 The CEDAW Committee has also stated
“gender-based violence is a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits
women’s ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with
men.”323 Moreover, the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women includes spousal rape in its definition of violence
against women.324 Spousal rape is a form of gender-based sexual violence, as
women disproportionately suffer from spousal rape.325 In Vertido v. Philip-
pines, the CEDAW Committee reasoned that rape violates a woman’s right
to “personal security and bodily integrity.”326 Spousal rape is a tool of domi-
319. Sexual Offences Act (Act 9/1995), § 4 (Ant. & Barb.).
320. Id.
321. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommen-
dation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties under Article 2 of the Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 47th
Sess., Oct. 4, 2010-Oct. 22, 2010, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/28, ¶ 5 (Dec. 16,
2010). See CEDAW, supra note 11, at art. 1 for a definition of “discrimination
against women.”
322. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommen-
dation No. 23, 16th Sess., 1997, ¶ 3, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/
recommendations/recomm.htm; see also CEDAW, supra note 11, at arts. 1, 11, 16.
323. Gen. Rec. No. 19, supra note 191, at ¶ 1.
324. G.A. Res. 48/104, art. 2(a), U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Feb. 23, 1994).
325. See West, supra note 317, at 66–70; see also Women in an Insecure World: Violence
Against Women Facts, Figures and Analysis, U.N. CHILDREN’S FUND 4 (Sept. 2005),
http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/women_insecure_world.pdf (arguing gender-
based violence includes rape and domestic violence and that women disproportion-
ately suffer from rape).
326. Vertido, supra note 146, at ¶ 8.7.
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nance that subjugates women by treating women like chattel, thereby mak-
ing women subject to the desires of their owners/husbands; “this
perpetuates the practice of treating women as second-class citizens and dis-
criminates against [women] on the basis of their gender.”327 While Com-
monwealth Countries should be lauded for ratifying CEDAW, in contrast
to other countries such as the United States who have not ratified CEDAW,
from a postcolonial perspective the spousal rape exemption forces Caribbean
women into gendered subalterneity.
It should be noted that the sexual offences laws of certain Common-
wealth Countries contain gender-neutral terms, so it may be possible for a
wife to be prosecuted for raping her husband.328 One may argue that be-
cause such statutes permit a husband and wife to both be equally prosecuted
for violating the other’s sexual autonomy, a wife’s sexual autonomy is
equally protected in comparison to her husband’s sexual autonomy. A mar-
ried woman’s right to sexual autonomy cannot be equally protected even
under a gender-neutral law, as women are more susceptible to spousal
rape.329 Women are more likely to be victims of spousal rape and therefore
are more likely to be required to satisfy the Standard Spousal Rape Condi-
tions to obtain protection from the law.
International tribunals and courts have developed case law that is an
important source of law in Commonwealth Caribbean jurisprudence.330
The Commonwealth Caribbean jurisprudence of the British Privy Council
has been significantly influenced by human rights decisions by a number of
international entities, including the European Court of Human Rights and
the United Nations Human Rights Committee.331 The European Conven-
tion on Human Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
heavily influenced the constitutions of many Commonwealth Countries,
such as the Bahamas.332 International courts have also concluded that vio-
327. Nancy Kaymar Stafford, Permission for Domestic Violence: Marital Rape in Ghanaian
Marriages, 29 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 63, 73 (2008).
328. See, e.g., Sexual Offences Act, ch. 99, pt. 15(1) (2014) (Bah.). The Act uses both
gender neutral and gender specific terms to describe spousal rape and provides in
part, “any person who has sexual intercourse with his spouse without the consent of
the spouse.” Id. (emphasis added). The term “person” is gender neutral; however, the
use of the term “his” may indicate only a husband can commit spousal rape, not a
wife.
329. See generally U.S. History of Marital Rape, CRISIS CONNECTION, http://www.crisis-
connectioninc.org/pdf/US_History_of_Marital_Rape.pdf [hereinafter Crisis Con-
nection] (last visited Apr. 21, 2014).
330. ANTOINE, supra note 103, at 206–09.
331. Id. at 207; see also Minister of Home Affairs v. Fisher [1980] A.C. 319 (P.C.) (appeal
taken from Berm.); Fisher v. Minister of Public Safety & Immigration [1998] A.C.
673 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Bah.).
332. ANTOINE, supra note 103, at 208.
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lence against women is a form of gender-based discrimination, which vio-
lates the obligation of a state to provide equal protection to its citizens.333 In
Opuz v. Turkey, the European Court on Human Rights held that Turkey
had violated the equal protection and antidiscrimination clause contained in
Article 14 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms,334 by failing to protect a married woman and
her mother from the repeated violent assaults inflicted by the husband of
the married woman.335 The court concluded that violence against women
was tolerated by Turkish authorities336 and found that “[a] [s]tate’s failure to
protect women against domestic violence breaches their right to equal pro-
tection of the law and . . . this failure does not need to be intentional.”337
In Bishop of Roman Catholic Diocese of Port Louis v. Suttyhudeo Tengur,
the British Privy Council reasoned that once an individual alleging violation
of antidiscrimination principles or the right to equal protection provides
evidence that he or she has been or would be treated differently from some
other similarly circumstanced person or persons, the alleged discriminator
must then justify the discrimination as “having a legitimate aim and as hav-
ing a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means em-
ployed and the aim sought to be realized.”338
As Part II of this Article discusses, one justification for the spousal
rape exemption is the protection of marital privacy and the promotion of
reconciliation between spouses, which has evolved from the unities theory.
Spousal rape more frequently occurs in relationships that involve other types
of violence, and, as a result, some researchers have concluded that spousal
rape is an “extension of domestic violence.”339 As the New York Court of
Appeals noted in People v. Liberta, a state arguably has no legitimate interest
in protecting marital privacy or promoting marital reconciliation where a
marriage involves domestic violence and where the marriage has decayed to
a point where the sexual relations of the spouses are no longer consensual
333. Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), http://www.refworld
.org/docid/4a2f84392.html.
334. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as
amended by Protocols No. 11 and No. 14, June 1, 2010, CETS No. 194. Article 14
provides “the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall
be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a na-
tional minority, property, birth or other status.” Id.
335. Opuz, App. No. 33401/02 at ¶¶ 7-69, 202.
336. Opuz, App. No. 33401/02 at ¶ 197.
337. Opuz, App. No. 33401/02 at ¶ 191.
338. Bishop of Roman Catholic Diocese of Port Louis v. Tengur, [2004] UKPC 9, ¶ 19
(P.C.) (appeal taken from Mauritius).
339. Crisis Connection, supra note 329, at 4; see also IDA M. JOHNSON & ROBERT T.
SIGLER, FORCED SEXUAL INTERCOURSE IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 22 (1997).
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and sexual abuse has occurred.340 CEDAW explicitly provides that states
must “modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices
which constitute discrimination against women” and “repeal all national
penal provisions which constitute discrimination against women.”341 The
statutes of Commonwealth Countries retain many of the gendered common
law justifications, as discussed in Part III of this Article. By codifying the
common law spousal rape exemption, Commonwealth Countries have
failed to meet their obligations under CEDAW to eliminate gender-based
violence. In addition, these statutes violate the equal protection provisions
of Caribbean constitutions, as husbands are free to rape their wives as long
as none of the Standard Spousal Rape Conditions are satisfied.
Requiring a woman to comply with the Standard Spousal Rape Con-
ditions prior to being raped by her husband is contrary to the goal of mari-
tal reconciliation. Satisfaction of at least one of the Standard Spousal Rape
Conditions requires the couple to take steps to dissolve their marriage
before a sexual assault; this requirement does not promote marital reconcili-
ation. What if a woman has no interest in filing for divorce or separation
but believes her husband should face consequences for raping her? The sex-
ual offences statutes of Commonwealth Countries fail to address this issue.
Moreover, even if one concedes that marital privacy is a legitimate
aim, the imposition of the Standard Spousal Rape Conditions is not reason-
ably proportionate, as these laws contribute to the continued subordination
of women. These laws fail “to ensure that all citizens are subject equally to
one and only one sovereign, namely the sovereignty of the rule of law,”342
and they fail to protect women raped by their husbands who cannot satisfy
one of the Standard Spousal Rape Conditions before the rape. Put differ-
ently, by requiring satisfaction of the Standard Spousal Rape Conditions,
the spousal rape exemptions contained in the laws of Commonwealth
Countries legitimize “a regime of private force and organized violence that
creates and encourages the male subordination of women and the insulation
of [a] separate and sovereign political regime through which that subordina-
tion is effectuated.”343 Furthermore, a law that provides no protection to
similarly situated individuals, specifically married women who are raped and
have satisfied at least one of the Standard Spousal Rape Conditions and
married women who are raped but have failed to satisfy any of the Standard
Spousal Rape Conditions, cannot be rational, legitimate, or reasonably
proportionate.
340. People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 574 (1984).
341. CEDAW, supra note 11, at art. 2.
342. West, supra note 317, at 71.
343. Id.
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Additionally, although some Commonwealth Countries such as Bar-
bados have adopted domestic violence statutes that may provide aid via the
issuance of protective orders to married women being abused by their hus-
bands,344 the law should do more than simply provide “some remedy” to
married women.345 The law should provide appropriate and adequate reme-
dies to women raped by their husbands.346
D. Judicial Internalization of IAS Convention
Judges could also use many of the provisions of the IAS Convention to
interpret other human rights provisions contained in the constitutions of
Commonwealth Countries, thereby justifying striking down the statutory
spousal rape exemption. Article 4 of the IAS Convention provides that
women have the right to life, liberty, and security of person.347 Similarly,
the constitutions of Commonwealth Countries contain a number of provi-
sions regarding the right to personal security that lend support to the call for
the elimination of the spousal rape exemption. For instance, the Constitu-
tion of Antigua and Barbuda (“Antiguan Constitution”) proscribes the vio-
lation of certain fundamental rights and freedoms, including, but not
limited to, the right of life, liberty, and security of the person.348 The consti-
tutions of Dominica,349 St. Lucia,350 Jamaica,351 Barbados,352 Bahamas,353
and Trinidad and Tobago354 also provide for the right to security of the
person and protection under the law. In addressing the right to protection
under the law in Ong Ah Chuan v. Public Prosecutor, the British Privy Coun-
cil reasoned that “[c]onstitution[s] . . . that purport to assure to all individ-
ual citizens the continued enjoyment of fundamental liberties or
rights, . . . [such as the] ‘protection of the law’ . . . refer to a system of law
which incorporates . . . fundamental rules of natural justice.”355
344. See Domestic Violence Act 1993, ch. 130A (Barb.). http://.unwomen.org//%20Vio-
lence%20Protection%20Orders%20Act%201993.pdfhttp://.unwomen.org//%20Vi-
olence%20Protection%20Orders%20Act%201993.pdf.
345. Hilf, supra note 74, at 42. (citation omitted).
346. Id.
347. Convention of Belém do Pará, supra note 11, at art. 4.
348. ANT. & BARB. CONST., arts 3–15.
349. DOMINICA CONST., art. 1.
350. ST. LUCIA CONST., art. 1(a).
351. JAM. CONST., art. 13(a).
352. BARB. CONST., art 11(a).
353. BAH. CONST., art. 15(a).
354. TRIN & TOBAGO CONST., art. 4(a).
355. Ong Ah Chuan v. Pub. Prosecutor, [1980] UKPC 32, [1981] A.C. 648 (P.C.) (ap-
peal taken from Sing.). The Privy Council has also held that the right to protection
of the law also includes a right to due process of the law. Lewis v. Att’y Gen. of Jam.,
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The IAS Convention provides “that violence against women is an of-
fense against human dignity and a manifestation of the historically unequal
power relations between women and men.” Scholars have defined human
dignity as “a kind of intrinsic worth that belongs equally to all human be-
ings as such, constituted by certain intrinsically valuable aspects of being
human,”356 and have further stated that “human dignity involves expressing
an attitude—the attitude of respect—toward the humanity in each man’s
person.”357 Jack Donnelly argues that human rights and the concept of
human dignity are inextricably intertwined.358 Donnelly posits that “human
rights reflect—or at least analytically can be understood to reflect—a partic-
ular specification of certain minimum preconditions for a life of dignity in
the contemporary world. But our detailed understanding of human dignity
is shaped by our ideas and practices of human rights.”359 Spousal rape, like
stranger rape, violates the human dignity of a woman, as a woman’s intrin-
sic worth as a human being has been attacked; in this situation, no respect is
accorded to the “humanity within a woman’s person.” Rape is a violation of
human dignity in that rape impacts the physical, mental, and emotional
well-being of a woman.360 Through rape, a woman becomes a mere tool of
her rapist’s sexual desires.361 By failing to protect a married woman that has
been raped by her husband, the laws of Commonwealth Countries signal to
perpetrators that a married woman’s right to human dignity is to be ac-
corded less value and protection than an unmarried woman’s right to
human dignity.
Caribbean judges must be willing to use unincorporated treaties to
elucidate the meaning of constitutional provisions, which can be used to
strike down domestic statutes that infringe on human rights.362 A woman’s
[2000] UKPC 35, [2001], 2 A.C. 50 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Jam.) (analyzing the
right to protection of the law under the Jamaican Constitution).
356. Alan Dewirth, Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF
RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 12 (M. J. Meyer & W. A. Par-
ent eds., 1992).
357. Jack Donnelly, Human Dignity and Human Rights, Swiss Initiative to Commemorate
the 60th Anniversary of the UDHR Protecting Dignity: An Agenda for Human
Rights Research Project on Human Dignity 82 (2009).
358. Id. at 83.
359. Id.
360. Martha Nussbaum, Human Diginity and Bioethics, ESSAYS COMMISSIONED BY THE
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS (Mar. 2008), available at http://bioethics
.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/human_dignity/chapter14.html.
361. Id.
362. For instance, in Reyes v. The Queen, the Privy Council used the ICCPR’s prohibition
on inhuman punishment to interpret Belize’s constitutional ban on inhuman treat-
ment and invalidated Belize’s mandatory death penalty statute. Reyes v. The Queen,
[2002] UKPC 11, 27-28, 41, 43, [2002] 2 A.C. at 247, 255–56. The Criminal
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security and human dignity are not guaranteed when the law fails to ade-
quately protect her from spousal rape. By criminalizing spousal rape only
when one of the Spousal Rape Conditions has been satisfied, Common-
wealth Countries fail to protect women who cannot satisfy these conditions.
These countries are arguably condoning sexual violence against women in
the context of marriage.
Article 3 of the IAS Convention states that “Every woman has the
right to be free from violence in both the public and private spheres.”363
The perpetuation of the spousal rape exemption via the imposition of the
Standard Spousal Rape Conditions and the lesser sentencing accorded to the
crime of spousal rape compared to stranger rape reinforces inequality be-
tween men and women within the private sphere of the home. It also per-
petuates sexual violence against women in the private sphere by failing to
adequately protect married women from husbands who sexually abuse
them.
In Pratt, the British Privy Council interpreted the right to be free from
inhumane treatment under Article 17 of the Jamaican Constitution, hold-
ing that it “prefer[red] an interpretation of the Constitution of Jamaica that
accepts civilized standards of behavior which will outlaw acts of inhuman-
ity.”364 David Mitchell posits “rape is universally included as a component
of every other jus cogens norm, and has long been [seen as] a violation of
Code of Belize provides, “Every person who commits murder shall suffer death.”
Belize Crim. Code, ch. 101, 106(1) (2000); See also Waters, supra note 288, at 681,
for a detailed discussion of the Reyes case. Waters contends that in Reyes, the “Privy
Council . . . took a turn toward a more monistic conception, creating a sort of
presumption that the people of Belize intended that their chosen ‘rules’ would com-
ply with international human rights law.” Id. at 681. When a domestic statute,
adopted prior to ratification of an international treaty that guarantees human rights
or obligates states to protect human rights, conflicts with the international treaty,
Caribbean judges should be willing to implement the last-in-time rule, meaning that
the later in time prevails in case of conflict. Shelton, supra note 268, at 5. If the
legislative branch adopted the conflicting domestic law after treaty ratification, Car-
ibbean judges should be willing to presume the legislative branch did not intend to
legislate against the state’s international treaty obligations. Id. at 625.
363. Convention of Belem do Pará, supra note 11, at art. 3.
364. Pratt, [1994] A.C. The right to be free from inhuman treatment can be found in the
constitutions of many Commonwealth Countries. See, e.g., ST. LUCIA CONST., art.
5; JAM. CONST., art. 17(1); BARB. CONST., 15(1); DOMINICA CONST., art. 5; BAH.
CONST., art. 17(1); ANT. & BARB. CONST., art. 7. The Trinidad and Tobago Con-
stitution does not contain a general reference to the right to be free from torture and
inhuman punishment. SIR FRED PHILLIPS, FREEDOM IN THE CARIBBEAN: A STUDY
IN CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 124 (1977).
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customary international law.”365 Moreover, arguments against establishing
rape as a principle of jus cogens “force one to make an inhuman, almost
barbaric [point] regarding why rape should not be expressly prohibited in all
situations.”366 The Inter-American Court on Human Rights has also recog-
nized rape as a form of torture.367 In Meja v. Peru, the Inter-American
Court on Human Rights held that the rape of a civilian woman by a Peru-
vian solider violated the American Convention on Human Rights and con-
stituted torture.368 The court found that “rape is considered to be a method
of psychological torture.”369 From the human rights perspective, it is neces-
sary to protect citizens from state-condoned actions and policies that may
deprive them of their human rights and negatively affect the global commu-
nity.370 In 2009, the Inter-American Human Rights Court held that, by
failing to effectively prevent or prosecute the rape and murder of three
women in Juarez, Mexico, the Mexican government had violated their rights
to life, personal integrity, and personal liberty as set forth in the American
Convention on Human Rights.371 The Inter-American Human Rights
Court ordered Mexico to prevent future violations through public report-
ing, education, and training.372
Rape is a brutal act that should be punished no matter the context.
International law requires Commonwealth Countries to protect married
women from rape at the hands of their husbands, even where a woman is
unable to satisfy the Standard Spousal Rape Conditions. When given the
opportunity to do so, Caribbean judges should be willing to declare that the
statutory spousal rape exemption violates not only international law, but
also constitutional provisions.
E. Judicial Internalization Despite Savings Clause
The savings clause contained in the constitutions of many Common-
wealth Countries may require Caribbean judges to consider preserving the
365. Davis S. Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in International Humanitarian Law as
Norm of Jus Cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine, 15 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 219, 226
(2005).
366. Id.; see also James R. McHenry III, The Prosecution of Rape Under International Law:
Justice That Is Long Overdue, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 1269, 1309 (2002).
367. See Mitchell, supra note 365, at 245.
368. Mejia v. Peru, Case 10.970, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 5/96, OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.91 doc. 7, at 157 (1996).
369. Mejia, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 5/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91 doc. 7, at
157.
370. LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
204–05 (1989).
371. González v. Mexico, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, ¶ 602(5) (Nov. 16 2009).
372. González, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, at ¶ 602(19–22).
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spousal rape exemption in some form. Savings clauses in Caribbean consti-
tutions have, in some instances, prevented local courts from protecting fun-
damental human rights.373 As discussed in Part I of this Article, the British
Privy Council has historically interpreted the savings clause of Common-
wealth Countries to mean that the rights guaranteed by the constitutions of
these countries are subject to the common law principles that existed prior
to emancipation. Historically, at common law, a man could not be con-
victed of raping his wife based on the many justifications that have been
discussed in detail in Part II of this Article. Therefore, one could argue that
the fundamental rights contained in the constitutions of Commonwealth
Countries, such as the right to protection from inhuman treatment, are
subject to the common law spousal rape exemption. However, the British
Privy Council has adopted a more liberal approach to interpreting savings
clauses in its recent decisions. Although the death penalty was legal under
the common law prior to Jamaica gaining independence, in the 2004 case of
Lambert v. the Queen (Attorney General for Jamaica Intervening), the British
Privy Council held that the imposition of the death penalty violated the
Jamaican Constitution.374
In Lambert, the British Privy Council held that the common law that
existed prior to Jamaica gaining independence recognizes the fundamental
rights set forth in the Jamaican constitution.375 The British Privy Council
reasoned that an analysis of Jamaica’s constitution must “proceed upon the
presumption that the fundamental rights that it covers are already secured to
the people of Jamaica by existing law.”376 The court also indicated that its
prior case law addressing savings clauses should not be interpreted to mean
that “human rights in Jamaica were to be frozen indefinitely at the point
they had reached [on emancipation] in August 1962.”377 The British Privy
Council went so far as to state that to the extent its prior decisions on saving
laws clauses prohibited “judicial modification or adaptation of any existing
373. Forsythe v. Att’y Gen. of Jam., (1997) 34 J.L.R. 512. In Forsythe, the Jamaican
Court of Appeals held a Rastafarian could not challenge laws criminalizing the use of
marijuana on religious grounds as these laws were in place prior to the development
of the Rastafarian religion. Id.; see also Burnham, supra note 211 (arguing that the
Caribbean Court of Justice should address the role of saving clauses in Caribbean
constitutions).
374. Watson v. The Queen [2004] UKPC 34, [2005] 1 A.C. 472 (appeal taken from
Jam.); see also Stephen Vasciannie, The Decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council in the Lambert Watson Case from Jamaica on the Mandatory Death Penalty and
the Question of Fragmentation, 41 INT’L L. & POL’Y. 837 (2009).
375. Watson, [2004] UKPC 34, at ¶¶ 59–61.
376. Watson, [2004] UKPC 34, at ¶ 41 (citation omitted).
377. Watson, [2004] UKPC 34, at ¶ 54.
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law to bring it into conformity with the human rights guarantees,” such
decisions should no longer be followed.378
Similarly, although the common law recognized the spousal rape ex-
emption prior to many Commonwealth Countries’ gaining independence
from Britain, under the more liberal interpretation of savings clauses
adopted by the British Privy Council, the common law that existed prior to
independence arguably acknowledges the existence of fundamental rights,
including the right of women to be free from sexual violence in the home.
The existence of savings clauses in the constitutions of Commonwealth
Countries does not prevent Commonwealth Countries from modifying
their laws to completely eliminate the spousal rape exemption and bring
them into conformity with international law.
Even after a country has domestically incorporated its treaty obliga-
tions, judges should have a continuing obligation to ensure that human
rights are protected. Judicial internalization is not without its limits. Judicial
activism may in some instances result in decisions that infringe on human
rights.379 This Article does not advocate for blanket judicial activism, but
instead calls for local judges to use international instruments to protect
human rights. By relying on domestic constitutional provisions to incorpo-
rate treaties, the extent to which such incorporation is effective will depend
on the language of the constitutional provisions.380 However, judicial inter-
nalization may also promote social and legislative internalization of the
norms established by CEDAW and the IAS Convention. Judicial decisions
using provisions of CEDAW and the IAS Convention in a manner that
promotes the human rights of women and highlights the importance of
state compliance with these conventions may lead the legislative branch to
directly incorporate these treaties into domestic legislation. Statements by
judges incorporating the provisions of CEDAW and the IAS Convention
may also encourage women and civil society groups to continue to use do-
mestic litigation as a tool to protect the human rights of women. Finally, it
may signal to the populace the importance of combatting gendered norms
that discriminate against women.381
378. Watson, [2004] UKPC 34, at ¶ 61.
379. See generally S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43855/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-145466#{“itemid”:[“001-
145466”]}. In S.A.S., the European Court of Human Rights upheld a French law
that banned face covering veils on the rational that the goal of social cohesion and
living together justifies the restriction which has a disparate impact on Muslim
women.
380. Neo, supra note 314, at 913.
381. Jivan, supra note 292, at 120.
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F. CARICOM’s Role in Promoting Internalization of
Human Rights Norms
All of the Commonwealth Countries are parties to the Inter-American
human rights system (“IAS”). As such the IAS has a crucial role to play with
respect to internalization of human rights norms; however, the IAS’s ability
to facilitate internalization may be limited in Commonwealth Countries.
Commonwealth Countries are under-represented in key structures of the
IAS system, and they do not have a sense of proprietorship in the IAS sys-
tem, which is often viewed as a Latin American endeavor. For instance,
decisions by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights are generally first
published in Spanish, as all of the judges on the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights are from Latin America, and it is only recently that a repre-
sentative from a Commonwealth Caribbean country has been appointed to
serve on the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.382 On the
other hand, Commonwealth Countries established CARICOM, and these
countries continue to actively participate in the CARICOM system.
CARICOM, as the regional organization that is responsible for im-
proving the living conditions of both Caribbean men and women, should
revise the CARICOM Model Law discussed in Part III of this Article to
eliminate the Standard Spousal Rape Conditions, to provide for equal sen-
tencing for spousal rape and stranger rape, and to define spousal rape as
rape rather than “an unlawful sexual connection.” To the extent that the law
impacts culture, the adoption of laws that refer to spousal rape as “rape,”
rather than “sexual assault” or “unlawful sexual connection,” can indicate
the seriousness with which the law views and treats incidences of spousal
rape. The sexual offences acts of Commonwealth Countries replicate the
spousal rape provisions of the CARICOM Model Law; thus, modification
of the CARICOM Model Law may prompt Commonwealth Countries to
begin modifying their own statutes. CARICOM should encourage Com-
monwealth Countries to further adopt effective educational programs aimed
at children to change cultural attitudes at a young age. CARICOM could
provide economic incentives to Commonwealth Countries that take con-
crete steps to combat embedded common law gendered norms that foster
the subjugation of women.
Spousal rape is a global problem that is not just limited to the Carib-
bean. Feminist scholars have proposed various solutions for changing cul-
382. See generally I/A Court Composition, INTER-AMERICAN COURT ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.php/en/about-us/composicion (last visited
Oct. 1, 2014); Inter-American Comm’n on Human Rights Composition, ORG. OF
AMERICAN STATES, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/composition.asp (last vis-
ited Oct. 1, 2014).
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tural attitudes that harm women. For instance, in the area of female genital
mutilation, which is a significant problem in various countries, feminist
scholars have proposed a three-pronged methodology for challenging the
negative cultural practices behind genital mutilation.383 This methodology
has been described as a “culturally sensitive approach to culturally challeng-
ing practices.”384 In promoting social internalization of international norms
under CEDAW and the IAS Convention, entities such as CARICOM, the
IAS, and the CEDAW Committee should consider the complexity of the
social environments in the Caribbean so as to better understand not only
what led to the creation of these negative norms, but also what continues to
sustain them. This Article is meant as an initial effort to unveil the role
played by colonialism and law in creating and perpetuating these norms, as
well as the continued responsibility of postcolonial countries to exercise
their agency to change these norms. Further, internalization must be done
in a manner that facilitates state compliance, rather than in a manner that
embarrasses states into non-compliance.
VII. CONCLUSION
The reasons for the lack of state compliance with international obliga-
tions are varied. This Article seeks to identify the ways in which the history
of colonialism influences identities, power dynamics, and legal reform in
postcolonial states, as well as address the willingness and the ability of
postcolonial states to protect the human rights of women. The Common-
wealth Countries’ continued overreliance on legal principles and statutes
established during the colonial period, coupled with their failure to update
laws to ensure compliance with international obligations, have had far-
reaching implications for the human rights of women in these countries, as
well as implications on their ability to comply with human rights norms
established by international law and by their respective constitutions. The
spousal rape exemption is a relic of the British common law. Gendered
justifications regarding women’s role in society led to the creation of the
common law spousal rape exemption, which was imposed on Common-
wealth Countries via the doctrine of reception during the colonial period.
383. Isabelle Gunning, Arrogant Perception, World Travelling, and Multicultural Feminism:
The Case of Female Genital Surgeries, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 189, 194
(1992). Gunning proposes the following methodology: (1) understand one’s own
historical context including recognizing shared negative cultural practices that are
present in one’s own country and in the country whose cultural practices one seeks
to change; (2) understand how as an outsider one impacts on the ‘other’s’ worlds and
is perceived by the ‘other’; and (3) recognize the complexities of the life circum-
stances of the ‘other’ woman. Id.
384. Id. at 244.
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The spousal rape exemption as codified by Commonwealth Countries facili-
tates the maintenance of colonial hierarchies and identities that relegate
women to the bottom rung of societal order. The retention of gendered
common law norms strips women of their sexual autonomy and facilitates
the subjugation of women as “objects” under the law. Further, by codifying
the spousal rape exemption, Commonwealth Countries have not only cre-
ated dissonance between domestic laws and their international obligations,
but they have also created conflicts between human rights guaranteed by
their constitutions and by domestic statutes.
Colonialism continues to have a unique impact on Commonwealth
Countries. This suggests a need for tailored efforts to protect human rights
and facilitate postcolonial Caribbean state compliance with international
treaties. Unlike most former British colonial territories, Commonwealth
Countries continue to rely on the British Privy Council as their final court
of appeals. On one hand, Commonwealth Countries understand that the
British Privy Council has been preserved as their Supreme Court and, as a
result, decisions rendered by the British Privy Council are binding. On the
other hand, as the 1990s Caribbean opposition to human rights indicates,
postcolonial Caribbean states appear particularly sensitive to the top-down
imposition of modern human rights norms, which have been accepted by
their former colonizer. This colonial history indicates that legal change may
have a greater likelihood of success when generated by an internal source
(that is by local women’s movement and Caribbean judges) rather than an
external source with a long colonial history, such as the British Privy Coun-
cil. Given the opposition to British Privy Council decisions, local Caribbean
justices must play an instrumental role in creating harmony between domes-
tic laws and international human rights.
Trinidad and Tobago’s failure to directly incorporate CEDAW and the
IAS Convention on the municipal plane signals that the country may place
less emphasis on the rights of women. To the extent that the law is viewed
as inspirational, domestic incorporation of CEDAW and the IAS Conven-
tion may signal governmental commitment to societal changes that protect
women from sexual violence. Trinidad and Tobago’s experience also indi-
cates that for transformative legal change to be realistically effective, the
gendered norms and identities that negatively affect the human rights of
women must also be changed. A combination of legal and social change is
needed not only to enable Caribbean women to overcome their subaltern
status, but also to increase the ability of Commonwealth Countries to pro-
tect the human rights of Caribbean women and thereby comply with inter-
national obligations under CEDAW and the IAS Convention.

